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ABSTRACT 
The rapid growth and modernization of China’s economic, political, and military strength 
over the past two decades has inspired growing acrimony and concern in the United 
States. Washington strongly desires the continued peace and stability in Asia, and 
China’s subsequent rise may eventually threaten American interests in the Pacific. 
Furthermore, China’s various territorial disputes could upset regional stability, and as 
China grows stronger, it may decide to use its increasing military strength to push for 
resolutions to the disputes in China’s favor. The question remains: how likely is China to 
use force to solve its territorial disputes and, should China use force, will the United 
States ultimately be drawn into the conflict? 
Case studies that involve three of the most potentially volatile of China’s 
territorial disputes in Central Asia, India, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands seem to 
suggest that war is not inevitable, and that historically China has very rarely gone to war 
to resolve a territorial dispute. Ultimately, historical analysis suggests that China prefers 
to maintain its territorial disputes so they can be used in diplomatic negotiations as 
bargaining pieces, and that China has only gone to war when it has lost all bargaining 
power. Therefore, the current situation, wherein China seemingly has increased its 
bargaining leverage as its military power has grown, seems to suggest that for the near 
term, war is highly unlikely. 
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The rapid growth and modernization of China’s economic, political, and military 
strength over the past two decades has inspired growing acrimony and concern within the 
Pentagon. Washington is concerned that as Beijing’s international power expands, it 
might “take advantage of a more advanced military to threaten the use of force, or 
actually use force, to facilitate desirable resolutions…of territorial claims.”1 While the 
focus of the international community has largely been centered on the continued threat of 
an invasion of Taiwan and China’s contested territorial claims in the South China Sea as 
the most likely sources of Chinese aggression, there are numerous lesser-known 
territorial disputes along China’s periphery that could result in armed conflict—and could 
ultimately necessitate an American military response—in the near term.  
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis asks the question how likely is a Chinese territorial dispute to lead to 
war and ultimately upset the regional stability of Asia? To examine this question this 
thesis provides an analysis of three of the most inflammatory of China’s disputed 
territorial claims and their potential for conflict: the Senkaku Islands, the China-India 
border, and the Islamic borderlands of China’s tumultuous boundary with several Central 
Asian states. In each case study, this thesis considers the historical origins of each 
dispute, as well as what the most likely Chinese response to an escalation of hostilities in 
the future would be. More broadly, this thesis also asks what factors make territorial 
disputes so particularly contentious and how might a better understanding of the political 
motivations behind territorial disputes influence future American foreign policy in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                 
1 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.  
 2 
C. IMPORTANCE  
Stephen Van Evera declares that “states fight when they think they will 
prevail…when they believe that conquest is easy.”2 With the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the two decades since 
the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has found itself 
able to further advance its military influence on the Asian continent. Over the past 
decade, while the United States (U.S.) military has been tied down in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, China has strengthened its capabilities in the region, causing analysts, such 
as Aaron Friedberg to suggest that China is “acquiring the capabilities to project its 
power, extend its influence and defend its increasingly far-flung interests” and ultimately 
challenge U.S. influence in Asia.3 Thus, as Van Evera’s thesis suggests, as China’s 
military capability relative to its neighbors increases, China may soon decide to act 
aggressively to secure its longstanding territorial interests in the region.  
As the United States military adjusts over the coming years to Washington’s 
much-publicized “pivot to the Pacific,” the likelihood of American involvement in a 
Chinese territorial dispute increases. As the pivot illustrates, American strategic interests 
are tied to the continued peace and stability of Asia. The United States has no desire to 
see a territorial dispute in Asia escalate into war, and as Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Jonathan Greenert declared with regards to a potential conflict with China, the 
United States “need[s] to avoid any kind of conflict, avoid miscalculation, and the best 
way to do that is to sort out how to talk to each other...learn how to communicate.”4 
Therefore, it is paramount for the United States to be fully aware of the background and 
motivations behind China’s territorial disputes so Washington can handle these issues 
diplomatically while also being prepared to act in the event that the status quo within the 
region changes. Furthermore, understanding how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
                                                 
2 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 255.  
3 Aaron Friedberg and Robert Ross, “Here Be Dragons—Is China a Military Threat?,” The National 
Interest, no. 103 (September/October 2009): 20.  
4 Kyodo News Agency, “U.S. Official Urges Communication To Avoid Territorial Flare-Ups,” The 
Early Bird, May 15, 2013.  
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and the PLA act in response to increased tension along China’s immediate periphery will 
go a long way toward answering the larger strategic question that has concerned 
Washington: does China wish to usurp American geopolitical influence in Asia? 
I argue in this thesis that China’s rise does not have to threaten the security of the 
United States. Additionally, China’s ascension could provide the United States with a key 
ally in the region. Like the United States, China’s interests are greatly tied to the 
continued peace and stability of the Pacific. Along its western border in particular, where 
China faces the daunting prospect of the infiltration of Islamic extremists from the 
Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan into the Uyghur separatist 
movement in Xinjiang, there is a great potential for political and military cooperation 
between Washington and Beijing. Additionally, as China’s power rises, the closer its 
strategic interests in Asia may eventually align with American foreign policy. Therefore, 
if a greater effort is made in Washington to understand the context behind China’s 
territorial concerns, the United States may find itself in a better position to understand 
China’s intentions and ultimately be able to better use diplomacy to avoid unnecessary 
conflict. Guaranteeing the peaceful resolution of China’s territorial disputes is in 
everyone’s best interest, and thus a greater understanding of China’s past and future 
policy in regards to its contentious borders may prove to be the difference between war 
and peace. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary issue that emerges in any study of Chinese military intentions is that 
there is no broad consensus among China analysts as to what China’s true intentions are 
in building up its military capabilities. Opinions in Washington regarding China’s 
military buildup and the likelihood of Chinese aggression in Asia range from alarmists 
who fear a second coming of the Cold War, to pragmatists, such as Taylor Fravel who 
believe that China is most likely to solve its territorial disputes through diplomacy and 
that war among China and its neighbors is highly unlikely.5 While China’s ability to 
settle territorial disputes with diplomacy since the end of the Cold War suggests that 
                                                 
5 Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation, 319.  
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Fravel’s thesis has merit, China has acted aggressively in the past when diplomacy failed, 
and China’s growing strength may increase its willingness to use the military option. 
Either way, this topic is primed for debate. 
Another problem that has emerged in this study is it is mostly focused on the 
Chinese reaction to territorial disputes and may not be able to take into account an 
irrational action by one of China’s neighbors. For example, should rising nationalism and 
political pressure compel Japan to attempt to forcefully remove the PLA-N from the 
Senkaku islands, Beijing—despite a desire to resolve the situation diplomatically—may 
be pushed into a situation where it has no other option but to respond to Japanese 
aggression militarily. A final issue that came about during the course of this study is the 
difficulty in predicting the actions of non-state actors. Non-state actors, such as terrorist 
groups are often not rational actors and may not be deterred from violence despite 
China’s overwhelming military superiority in the region. This will become of primary 
concern in the analysis of China’s rugged western border, where Beijing’s major issue is 
not with the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan 
themselves—most territorial disputes there have been resolved or deferred since the 
breakup of the Soviet Union—but with the threat of Islamic radicalism spreading into 
Xinjiang province and fostering religious animosity among the Uyghur minority.6  
Each case study examines several hypotheses regarding Chinese territorial 
disputes. For structural purposes, these hypotheses may be divided among hypotheses 
concerned with China’s political motivations for ramping up territorial disputes, China’s 
likely response to an increase in hostility over a contested region, and the implications to 
U.S. interests in the region. With regard to China’s political ambitions, two competing 
hypotheses are examined. One hypothesis stipulates that China’s heightened rhetoric 
regarding contentious territorial issues, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with Japan is 
merely a ploy by the CCP to distract an increasingly informed public from growing 
domestic concerns within China and drum up support for the party. Conversely, another 
hypothesis contends that China has nothing to gain politically from inflaming its 
                                                 
6 Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation, 165–166.  
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neighbors over largely uninhabited and strategically insignificant borders and thus is 
unlikely to be willing to go to war in a heightened situation. 
Regarding China’s likely response to an act of hostility in a disputed region, this 
thesis hypothesizes that the PLA is likely to use its technologically superior military to 
overwhelm its enemy in an attempt to end the conflict quickly and decisively. China has 
no desire to be caught in a protracted struggle with a numerically inferior adversary, 
where the international community is likely to become more engaged—resulting in the 
escalation of the conflict--and the possible involvement of the United States military. 
This said, a competing hypothesis regarding China’s likely response to a territorial 
dispute centers around Fravel’s thesis that China is most likely going to use diplomatic 
means and pursue compromise in its territorial disputes. In this scenario, China would use 
a territorial dispute as leverage to achieve a compromise with the competing nation on 
another political concern. A prime example of this is highlighted by Fravel in Strong 
Borders Secure Nation, in which he describes China’s compromise in the mid-1990s over 
the contested border with the newly formed Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in order to secure their commitment not to support the Uyghur 
separatist movement in Xinjiang.7  
Lastly, in regards to the implications on U.S. foreign policy in the region, one 
hypothesis this study puts forward is that an increased American military presence in the 
region (i.e., “the pivot to the Pacific”) is likely to exacerbate the political tension in the 
region and may have the adverse effect of hardening the Chinese resolve to pursue 
military solutions to their territorial disputes. A competing hypothesis stipulates that the 
United States may reduce the probability of conflict in the region by pursuing a “lighter 
footprint approach” militarily, and instead work to improve diplomatic coordination with 
Beijing via the State Department and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in an 
effort to enhance Beijing and Washington’s shared interests in the region.  
Of the proposed hypotheses this thesis examines, the strongest case can be made 
for the hypothesis that the CCP is using territorial disputes as merely a means to secure 
                                                 
7 Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation, 159.  
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domestic power. Historical evidence has shown that the PRC has rarely used military 
force over the course of the past few decades, and thus increased rhetoric is likely the 
result of the CCP to rally its citizens around the flag, and thus consolidate its control over 
an increasingly liberalizing civil society.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The primary method for analyzing Chinese territorial disputes and the proclivity 
of each to escalate into conflict is a historical examination of three case studies. By 
underscoring the theoretical causes behind territorial disputes combined with the 
historical background to each of the three disputes, predictions about the possibility of 
future escalation in each case can be reached. In each case study, hypotheses regarding 
China’s military buildup, territorial aspirations, and Beijing’s likely response to an 
escalation of conflict will be tested against historical evidence and current developments. 
Subsequently, conclusions can then be drawn regarding how these conclusions should 
affect U.S. foreign policy and what recommendations can be made concerning future 
American involvement in the region.  
This said the examination of China’s lesser-known territorial disputes does not 
involve a detailed discussion of the remarkable modernization of the PLA, nor a 
comparison of China’s military capability relevant to its neighbors. Therefore, in writing 
this thesis, the assumption can be made that China can satisfy these territorial disputes 
militarily if it so desires, and thus, the real question is whether Beijing will ultimately 
pursue military solutions to these issues—which could bring instability to the region and 
possibly compel U.S. involvement. Furthermore, this study is focused mostly on Chinese 
intentions, and thus unforeseen aggressive action by Japan, India, or the Central Asian 
states played a much smaller role in the development of the thesis.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This examination of China’s lesser-known territorial disputes and their proclivity 




• Major Theoretical Perspectives on Territorial Disputes 
• Case Study I: The Central Asian States and Xinjiang province 
• Case Study II: Aksai-Chin and the China-India Border 
• Case Study III: The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
• Conclusions and Implications to U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia 
The theoretical perspectives section focuses exclusively on the works of historians 
and political scientists—such as Taylor Fravel and John Mearsheimer—and discusses the 
major schools of thought (pragmatists and alarmists) regarding the significance of 
analyzing territorial disputes and their general propensity to escalate into conflict. The 
case study on Xinjiang province and the Central Asian states focuses primarily on 
China’s Uyghur Separatist movement and the influence of Islamic militants potentially 
crossing the border and conducting terrorist attacks against CCP and PLA elements in 
Xinjiang. Xinjiang is important because it represents a unique opportunity for Chinese 
and American interests to potentially collaborate, as both nations share a desire to root 
out Islamic radicals in the region. The case study on Aksai-Chin and the China-India 
border analyzes the historical causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, what policies 
led to a general reconciliation of the dispute in the 1990s, and why tension along the 
border has flared up again over the past year. This case study is of particular importance 
because it has led to conflict in the past and despite diplomatic agreements, remains a 
point of contention between the two most-populous nations in the world. The potential 
for a massive land war in Southeast Asia, though remote, is particularly troublesome due 
to the ownership of nuclear weapons by both countries.  
The case study regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands focuses on the growing 
nationalism within both China and Japan—which is intensified by the lasting legacy of 
Japanese imperialism during the early twentieth century—and why this intense hatred 
and distrust of one another has created a potentially catastrophic situation in the East 
China Sea. Furthermore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute is of particular importance 
to the United States due to Washington’s Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with 
Japan, which necessitates American military assistance in the event Japan is attacked. A 
 8 
Chinese threat to the islands, which the United States has declared will be defended as 
part of the treaty, thus represents a real threat of war with the PRC. Thus, outside a 
Chinese invasion of Taiwan, no situation in Asia represents perhaps a bigger threat of a 
superpower war between Washington and Beijing than the Chinese rift with Tokyo over 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  
Lastly, the section on implications to U.S. policy in Asia takes a closer look at the 
overall likelihood of conflict in the region, as well as discusses the major issues that 
could lead to escalation. With this analysis, conclusions will be made about what the 
United States should do to help ensure the continued peace and stability of the region, 
and how the actions of the Chinese can facilitate these policies. Based on the research, 
this section assesses whether Washington should pursue realist policies in the region and 
seek to use its military power to deter Beijing from action, or whether it should take 
liberal measures and work to lessen its military footprint in the region, while utilizing 
diplomatic channels and economic interdependence to draw the PRC deeper into the 
international community. By studying the history of these territorial disputes and 
understanding how they fit into the bigger theoretical context regarding the causes of 
conflict, answers to these fundamental questions are proposed. 
 9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Analysis of the potential for escalation of a Chinese territorial dispute into a 
regional war requires a further examination of existing literature regarding whether 
China’s rise is a harbinger of potential chaos in Asia. Furthermore, a thorough discussion 
of why territorial disputes in general are so potentially dangerous is also necessary. In 
this context, this chapter examines the scholarly debate about whether China can rise 
peacefully or not, while also discussing why an escalation of a territorial dispute is the 
most likely cause for an uptick in hostilities between Washington and Beijing. 
Consequently, an examination of the potential escalation of a Chinese territorial 
dispute into war encompasses two primary literatures: one on China’s strategic position 
in the world today; and another on the broader role of borders and territorial disputes as a 
cause on international conflict. These literatures help to answer the major research 
questions addressed in this thesis by providing numerous interpretations and conclusions 
regarding both China’s military aspirations in the region and the overall relevance of the 
study of territorial disputes in predicting future conflict. 
B. IS CHINA’S RISE DANGEROUS? 
There are two prevailing schools of thought regarding the political ramifications 
of Beijing’s rise: alarmists who see China as an emerging power bent on establishing 
regional hegemony in Asia; and pragmatists who believe the recent history of the PRC 
shows a political regime that needs stability to maintain power and that has more often 
than not dealt with its territorial disputes with diplomacy instead of violence.  
The leading voice of the alarmist school of thought regarding the China threat is 
realist theorist John Mearsheimer. In his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 
Mearsheimer argues that China presents the most dangerous potential threat to 
Washington.8 Mearsheimer openly attacks the neo-liberal view that the threat of a great 
                                                 
8 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001), 362.  
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power war has been expelled from the world and contends that China’s political rise and 
increasing military influence in Asia is a prime example of realist policies. Accordingly, 
Mearsheimer argues that China represents the “high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold 
War world” and that its actions since the fall of the Berlin Wall have been designed to 
establish its role as the dominant power in Asia.9 Mearsheimer sees little room for 
cooperation between China and the United States on security issues because Beijing 
believes that “the United States is bent on preventing China from becoming the dominant 
great power in Northeast Asia” and thus stands in the way of the achievement of the 
PRC’s strategic goals in the region.10 Asserting that relations between Beijing and 
Washington have “worsened” since the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer contends the 
CCP sees the United States—due to its continued alliance with Japan and unspoken 
support for Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island—as its most likely 
potential enemy.11  
Mearsheimer does acknowledge that China has avoided the use of military force 
since the end of the Cold War, but he argues it should not be forgotten that Beijing has 
“demonstrated [in the past] that is willing to employ the sword to achieve particular 
political goals.”12 Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues China’s lack of military action over 
the past two decades has been due to its “limited power-projection capability, and 
therefore it cannot be too aggressive toward other states in the region.”13 To solve this 
issue, Mearsheimer points to China’s massive military modernization program over the 
past three decades, which he views as evidence that China’s current inaction in the region 
will not last indefinitely.  
Mearsheimer concludes that the current American foreign policy to “engage” 
China instead of “contain” it is misguided. He insists, “a wealthy China would not be a 
                                                 
9 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 375.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., 376.  
13 Ibid.  
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status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.”14 
China will do so, Mearsheimer continues, not because it is an evil nation, but “because 
the best way for any state to maximize its prospects for survival is to be the hegemon in 
its region of the world.”15 Thus, because it is not in America’s best interest to allow 
China to assume hegemony over Asia, a potential conflict in the Pacific theater is highly 
possible in the coming decades.  
Since writing The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer has revisited the 
issue of the rise of Chinese political power in Asia. In his 2010 essay, “The Gathering 
Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” Mearsheimer reasserts his position that 
a potential war between Beijing and Washington is likely to occur in the not-so-distant 
future.16 Rehashing his previous assessment that China is merely following traditional 
realist doctrine by expanding its influence in the Asia-Pacific region, he writes that 
Beijing’s strategic interests are undoubtedly going to challenge American hegemony in 
the Pacific. Mearsheimer argues that China’s military buildup is rational, asking the 
question, “Why would China feel safe with U.S. forces deployed on its doorstep? 
Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would not China’s security be better served 
by pushing the American military out of the Asia-Pacific region?”17 Conversely, 
Mearsheimer argues that the United States has no desire to relinquish its role as the 
hegemonic power in Asia, and thus “can be expected to go to great lengths to contain 
China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to rule the roost 
in Asia.”18 Consequently, Mearsheimer concludes that a war between a rising China and 
the United States is becoming increasingly likely.  
The closest supporter of Mearsheimer’s thesis is Aaron Friedberg, who argues in 
an essay titled “Here Be Dragons” that China’s rise is a direct challenge to American 
strategic interests in Asia. Friedberg contends that China’s military modernization has 
                                                 
14 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 402.  
15 Ibid.  
16 John Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 382.  
17 Ibid., 390.  
18 Ibid.  
 12 
been directed specifically at developing the capabilities to limit the ability of the 
American military to dictate its will in the Pacific. These capabilities are known as an 
“anti-access/area-denial” strategy, and Friedberg declares China’s goal is “not to match 
the American’s ship-for-ship and plane-for-plane but rather to develop certain specialized 
capabilities designed to make it difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. forces to operate 
freely anywhere close to China’s coasts.”19 Furthermore, like Mearsheimer, Friedberg 
disagrees with the current American policy to “engage” China, because “despite 
America’s fervent embrace in recent years, [China] has shown no inclination whatsoever 
to slow [its] military buildup.”20 Thus, Friedberg concludes, China does not see the 
Untied States as an ally but as a “strategic competitor” in Asia. 
While not as fervent as Friedberg, Unryu Suganuma also shares Mearsheimer’s 
contention that China’s rise could result in a great power conflict in Asia. A Japanese 
international relations theorist, Suganuma believes the rise of Japanese nationalism, 
combined with China’s increasingly aggressive policies concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, could lead to a third Sino-Japanese War. In his book, Sovereign Rights and 
Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations, Suganuma points to irredentism as the 
likely cause for the increased hostility between the two nations over a seemingly 
insignificant group of rocks. Therefore, China and Japan each believes that it has a 
historical “right” to the islands, and that “challenges to the territorial integrity of the state 
become challenges to the definition of the people and their history.”21 Suganuma declares 
that China’s military rise makes a diplomatic resolution of the territorial dispute unlikely. 
In particular, China’s increased capability has put it in a unique position of strength 
regarding the Japanese, and thus, the “Chinese will not make any compromise” with its 
former colonizer.22 Furthermore, Suganuma concludes that China’s increased self-
confidence expands to include the potential of an escalated conflict with the United 
States, whom it sees likely to intervene on behalf of its ally Tokyo. As evidence, 
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Suganuma cites a speech in 1993 by CCP leader Jiang Zemin, who declared, “we are not 
afraid of…confrontation and challenge with hegemonists [sic]. For the motherland’s 
sovereignty, independence and dignity, we are ready to pay a price.”23 Thus, outside the 
complete withdrawal of Japanese territorial claims for Diaoyu/Senkaku—which he 
believes is highly unlikely—Suganuma concludes that the territorial disputes between 
China and Japan are likely to lead to conflict.24  
The second school of thought on Chinese territorial intentions, dubbed 
pragmatists in this work, contends that China’s recent political rise and military buildup 
do not pose a direct threat to peace and stability in Asia. The leading voice of this school 
of thought is Taylor Fravel, whose 2008 book Strong Borders Secure Nation is an 
encompassing look at the history of the PRC’s territorial disputes. Fravel’s main thesis is 
that upon examination of China’s past, it is apparent that China will most likely use 
diplomatic measures—and will therefore restrain from using violence—in order to secure 
its territorial claims. Fravel points out that since the founding of the PRC in 1949, China 
has “participated in twenty-three…territorial disputes with its neighbors…yet it has 
pursued compromise and offered concessions in seventeen of these conflicts.”25 
Therefore, Fravel believes an analysis of China’s history proves it is much more likely to 
pursue diplomacy and compromise over contested regions than use military force.  
The crux of Fravel’s argument is his contention that a state is more likely to 
bargain in a dispute when it is in a position of greater strength than its adversary. Thus, as 
China’s relative power grows, Beijing is much more likely to pursue diplomatic measures 
to resolve any disputes that may arise. Conversely, Fravel insists China’s history has 
shown it is more willing to use military force in a situation where its bargaining power 
has declined. Fravel contends the most dangerous situation is “when a state concludes 
that an adversary is strengthening its relative position in a dispute…[therefore] inaction 
becomes more costly than threatening or even using force to halt or reverse its decline.”26 
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Thus, Fravel concludes that as long as Beijing continues to have the superior bargaining 
position regarding its territorial disputes, then it is likely to use military force only as a 
last resort. Additionally, Beijing’s compromises in past disputes have “signaled its 
acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors” and thus lessened 
the chances of future conflict on its borders.27 However, Fravel warns China will use 
force “when its vital interests are at stake” (such as in Taiwan). Nevertheless, Fravel 
concludes that Taiwan “provides a poor indicator of China’s territorial ambitions in the 
region and its willingness to resort to force in the future” since it is seen within Beijing as 
a “core interest” and not a territorial dispute.28 Therefore, while the potential for Chinese 
military action may persist, Fravel believes it will not be the result of any enduring 
territorial dispute. 
Other scholars who share Fravel’s opinion that future Chinese aggression on its 
borders is unlikely are David Finklestein and Robert Ross—though they differ on why 
Chinese aggression is unlikely. Finklestein, in his essay “Chinese Perceptions of the 
Costs of a Conflict,” concludes that the likelihood of Chinese military aggression in a 
territorial dispute—particularly regarding Taiwan—decreases significantly as China’s 
ties to the West and the ASEAN countries strengthen. Finklestein contends the PRC is 
foremost concerned with economic reform and modernization, and that the escalation of a 
territorial dispute into war would place their long-term goals of economic prosperity at 
risk. Therefore, Finkelstein argues, “A protracted struggle might drag in the developed 
Western world and Japan and dramatically and adversely affect the nature of foreign 
investment and…assistance to long-term economic and other modernization programs.”29 
Consequently, Finkelstein contends that China cannot afford to risk its growing economic 
and political power over what he views are superfluous territorial claims.  
Ross, on the other hand, believes that China will not act aggressively in Asia due 
to its continued inferiority compared to the United States military. Ross concludes that 
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Washington remains the preeminent power in Asia and will do what is necessary to check 
Chinese aggression in the region. Ross acknowledges that China’s confidence in its 
military capabilities has increased in recent years, but he counters that China faces 
“enduring difficulties…in developing advanced weaponry, [its forces continue to be 
vulnerable] to U.S. capabilities and [Washington has consistently been able to] adjust 
defense policy to maintain superiority in the western Pacific.”30 Therefore, despite its 
rapid modernization, the PLA still remains inferior to Washington’s capabilities, and thus 
the continued presence of the American military in Asia will continue to act as a deterrent 
to Chinese aggression for the foreseeable future. 
C. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: WHY 
ARE THEY SO VOLATILE? 
In regard to the theoretical causes and implications of territorial disputes, the most 
comprehensive academic work on the subject is Paul Huth’s 1998 book Standing Your 
Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Huth contends that the lack of 
study in international politics regarding territorial disputes can be drawn from an 
overarching bias among scholars to only focus on the actions of major Western and 
European powers—who have maintained fairly stable physical borders over the past 
century.31 Huth argues that a study of territorial disputes is necessary because history has 
proven that territorial disputes are likely only to end in military violence. Huth’s main 
thesis is that political leaders have no incentive to compromise in territorial disputes 
because it would be seen domestically as a significant “foreign policy defeat for the 
leadership and risked popular…opposition. Thus, disputes involving issues of ethnic 
irredentism, national unification, or the recovery of lost national territory were generally 
not settled by compromise.”32 These domestic influences on the political decision-
making process stand as the primary evidence Huth points to in supporting his thesis. In 
the end, Huth contends, “foreign policy decision makers are…leaders who view security 
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policy as both a potential threat to their position of domestic political power, as well as an 
opportunity to strengthen their domestic political position.”33 Therefore, an analysis of 
Huth’s argument suggests that the PRC is unlikely to compromise over its territorial 
claims in the Diaoyu Islands because doing so would be seen among the Chinese people 
as a political defeat to the hated Japanese. Taken a step further, in an instance where 
political unrest in China escalates to a level the CCP is uncomfortable with, they can 
drum up nationalistic fervor over Japan’s claims to the islands to help consolidate their 
control over the country.  
Building upon Huth’s thesis, Krista Wiegand’s book Enduring Territorial 
Disputes argues that territorial disputes often go unresolved as a result of their ability to 
be used as a bargaining chip in non-territorial negotiations. Wiegand asserts that certain 
states can “benefit from the endurance of disputes when other salient disputed issues 
exist…[which] provides an opportunity for states to pursue a strategy of issue linkage and 
coercive diplomacy.”34 Thus, Wiegand—like Huth—concludes that states typically have 
little incentive to settle territorial disputes and are much more inclined to pursue military 
action if a dispute persists over a long period of time.35 Therefore, Wiegand believes the 
only way to remove the threat of conflict regarding a territorial dispute is to encourage 
greater cooperation among the rival states. Following the neo-liberal maxim that greater 
international cooperation and interdependence breeds peace and security, Wiegand 
proposes that states that engage in territorial disputes should join a “shared alliance, 
[sign] treaties on another [less contentious] issue, or [increase] trade or investment…so 
they are more willing to work toward resolution [of territorial concerns].”36 Hence, 
Wiegand concludes, “by resolving the other disputed issues [such as lack of trade or 
bilateral cooperation] states…have an incentive to engage in territorial dispute settlement 
attempts or even be willing to drop their territorial claims.”37  
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This said, does China’s recent military buildup give it any added advantage in 
resolving its territorial claims in Beijing’s favor? Interestingly, Huth’s thesis does not 
seem to support that argument. Huth contends that while increased military power does 
play a role in “deterring large-scale attacks,” it is not as useful in preventing the smaller-
scale “border raids and armed insurgencies” likely to drum up over a contested 
territory.38 Therefore, China’s massive military modernization program is unlikely to 
discourage the Uighur separatists in Xinjiang from taking advantage of China’s porous 
border with the Central Asian states since China’s development of an advanced fifth 
generation fighter aircraft or a new ballistic missile is going to have little tactical value in 
a border skirmish. In the eyes of the Uighur’s, China’s military might means little 
because their objective is not to invade and overthrow the PRC, but to create a situation 
within Xinjiang that further escalates the tension among the local population and further 
bolsters the insurgency. While Beijing may attempt to increase its military presence in the 
province to quell the insurgency, Huth’s thesis suggests that may only worsen the 
situation by infuriating the local population. 
Furthermore, Huth argues that since territorial disputes are mostly driven by 
domestic political fervor, a nation’s particular military power is of little consequence in 
the declaration of territorial claims and it will “not deter weak countries from making 
territorial claims or compel weak countries to make territorial concessions.”39 Therefore, 
while China’s navy has increased its power projection capability within the South China 
Sea, it has not deterred the significantly weaker Philippine or Vietnamese navies from 
asserting its rights to territorial sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal or the Paracel 
Islands. Consequently, Huth’s concludes that no matter the disparity in the relative 
military capabilities of two nations, if there is a domestic outcry for the resolution of a 
territorial dispute, then a given nation is unlikely to back down from a territorial claim 
and will be unlikely to compromise its territorial interests, even in the face of an 
overwhelming military threat.  
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Huth’s thesis infers that an uptick in domestic instability within China could cause 
the CCP to escalate tensions in a territorial dispute as a means to distract the local 
population from domestic concerns. Conversely, Taylor Fravel sees little reason to 
assume that a Chinese territorial dispute is likely to escalate due to domestic tensions. 
Fravel challenges the contention that domestic unrest could trigger an escalation of a 
territorial dispute and says China, since the end of the Cold War, represents an excellent 
test case for debunking that theory. Dubbed “Divisionary War Theory” by Edward 
Mansfield and Jack Snyder, the belief is that “leaders are more likely to escalate crisis 
during periods of domestic political unrest, using tensions abroad to unite and rally 
society at home.”40 Fravel disagrees with this analysis and instead asserts that while 
China has been rife with domestic turmoil over the past two decades, countless case 
studies has proven that “China usually pursued cooperation in its territorial disputes, not 
escalation.”41 The evidence seems to support Fravel’s argument, because despite 
significant domestic turmoil, and an increasingly superior military capability relative to 
its neighbors, “China has only used force twice since 1990, first with the occupation of 
Mischief Reef in late 1994 and then during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis”—which 
should be considered an outlier to China’s typical response to a territorial dispute since 
Taiwan has long been labeled a “core interest” for Beijing.42 Therefore, while territorial 
disputes clearly remain contentious issues, the CCP has shown little reason over the past 
two decades to cause the United States to believe that—outside of Taiwan—the PRC will 
pursue an aggressive military response to resolve its territorial disputes. As Fravel 
indicates, Beijing has been much more likely over the past twenty years to resolve its 
issues through bilateral diplomacy.  
This said, is past performance a real indicator of future action as Fravel suggests? 
John Mearsheimer would surely disagree. As he points out in his essay “The Gathering 
Storm,” while China may have pursued peaceful solutions in the past, it is no guarantee 
that it is likely to do so in the future. Mearsheimer argues that “it is impossible to identify 
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who will be running the foreign policy of any country five or 10 years from now, much 
less whether they will have aggressive intentions,” and therefore past performance cannot 
be used as an accurate predictor of future intentions.43 Thus, China may have perfectly 
innocent intentions today; however, any number of domestic or international geopolitical 
events could occur in the coming years to change the strategic thinking of the PRC. 
Consequently, it would be extremely foolhardy for the United States to use past events as 
the sole factor in determining the likelihood of an escalation of conflict in the Pacific, and 
thus it is prudent for Washington to take some precautionary measures—i.e., stationing 
additional naval assets in the region as part of the “Pivot to the Pacific”—in the event of 
an unanticipated outbreak of hostilities.  
Territorial disputes are potentially dangerous because they encompass emotions, 
such as nationalism, xenophobia, and irredentism, which are not tangible and thus 
unlikely to lead to compromise. Furthermore, China’s sudden rise and military expansion 
has come so quickly, its true ambitions and capabilities in the region are hard for foreign 
policy analysts to predict. Consequently, existing literature regarding both territorial 
disputes and China’s rise provide conflicting scenarios of what China’s future ambitions 
in Asia may hold. Furthermore, the inherent pessimism exhibited in both the Huth and 
Wiegand books—regarding the high potential for conflict surrounding territorial 
disputes—suggests that there remains a cause for concern among advocates for the status 
quo in Asia, and Washington must be cognizant of the potential for conflict in the region.  
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III. THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES AND XINJIANG PROVINCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the first of the three case studies discussed in this thesis: 
the role of the PRC in dealing with the Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang province 
and how China’s long and relatively unguarded border with the Central Asian states of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan could increase instability within China. This 
chapter examines the historical causes of the conflict within Xinjiang, and will also 
discuss if either the Uyghur’s or the Han have a legitimate historical claim toward 
governance of the region. Furthermore, due to the potential influx of modern-day 
mujahedeen into Xinjiang from these Central Asian states—as well as from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan—the PRC has been careful in dealing with the internal stability caused by 
the Uyghur separatists. Therefore, this chapter also analyzes competing hypotheses 
regarding China’s likely response to the situation and discusses whether China’s 
historical and more recent actions in the region offer any insight toward its future 
direction in dealing with this insurrection. Lastly, this chapter discusses the potential 
implications for U.S. foreign policy within Central Asia, and whether American desire to 
combat violent extremism in Central Asia could offer an avenue for increasing bilateral 
military engagement with the PLA. Consequently, this chapter ultimately concludes that 
the Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang has provided Washington an excellent 
opportunity to engage China not only on counterterrorism but also in regards to the 
protection of universal human rights. Therefore, the United States must pursue a peaceful 
settlement of this situation via existing neo-liberal institutions, such as the United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner of human rights. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The morning of September 11, 2001 was a watershed moment for international 
relations in Central Asia. The decision by Al-Qaeda to hijack commercial airliners and 
crash them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon shifted the attention of the 
American government to Central Asia—and to the staunch Islamic militarism that 
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seemed to be cultivated there. The subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 
2001 brought the full brunt of the American military to China’s western border, and 
helped confirm Beijing’s desire to solidify multilateral relations with Russia and the 
Central Asian nations as a consequence of expanding American firepower in the region.44 
More importantly, however, the September 11 attacks on the United States and the 
subsequent American Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) created for Beijing an excellent 
avenue for responding to the international condemnation centered on its heavy handed 
approach in suppressing the Uyghur revolts in Xinjiang.  
Linking the Uyghur movement to the broader global jihadist movement 
championed by Al-Qaeda, Beijing attempted to change the narrative regarding Xinjiang 
from an internal national separatist movement to an external international issue centered 
on the influx of Al-Qaeda supported radical Islamic terrorism.45 Consequently, the 
Uyghur separatists became referenced by the PRC as the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), and the actions of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) in 
Xinjiang was therefore justified when the United States government—arguably seeking 
to increase Beijing’s support for the broader GWOT and the eventual invasion of Iraq—
labeled the ETIM as an international terrorist organization. This decision was ultimately 
“the single most important act lending validity to China’s claims that it faces a substantial 
Uyghur terrorist threat…[since it] resulted in grave consequences affecting the lives of 
Uyghurs” by supplying to China the international approval necessary to violently 
suppress the Uyghur’s.46 
Therein lay the great quandary for American politicians desperate to recruit 
Chinese assistance to take a greater role in helping defeat violent extremist organizations: 
is the potential for economic and military assistance for counterterrorist operations from 
the Chinese really worth accepting Beijing’s definition of a terrorist organization? As the 
United States has withdrawn from its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
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subsequently stepped back from the broader GWOT—which President Barack Obama 
now labels as Overseas Contingency Operations—there seems to be a renewed emphasis 
among some in Washington getting China to answer for its human rights violations in 
Xinjiang. Therefore, U.S.-China relations regarding Xinjiang seem to be at a crossroads, 
particularly as the U.S. turned its attention once again toward the Pacific after a decade of 
war in the Middle East. 
C. HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT  
The main cause of the conflict between the Uyghur separatists and the Han-
dominant PRC rests in their stark disagreement over which group has historical 
precedence over governance of Xinjiang. As Stephen Van Evera declares in his essay 
“Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” how one side or another interprets history plays a 
major role in the potential volatility of a conflict. Therefore, he hypothesizes that “the 
more divergent of the beliefs of the nationalities about their mutual history...the greater 
the risk of war.”47 Consequently, applying Van Evera’s hypothesis to this case study, the 
fact that the Uyghurs and the Han have vastly different opinions about Chinese historical 
roots in Xinjiang means that they are not likely going to be able to come to a compromise 
in this situation, and therefore violent escalation of the conflict is likely to occur. 
Ironically, another of Van Evera’s hypotheses implies that violent escalation in 
Xinjiang is unlikely due to the huge advantage of Chinese military power in the region. 
Van Evera declares that “stateless nationalisms whose statehood is unattainable will lie 
dormant…deterred by the power of the central state. Nationalism…can produce war 
when the power-balance between [the state and the nationalists] shifts to allow the 
possibility of successful secession.”48 Thus, the simple fact that it is nearly impossible for 
the Uyghurs to win their independence from China should prohibit them from rebelling. 
Despite this, however, the Uyghurs have ignored the overwhelming dominance of the 
PLA in Xinjiang and have continued to push for independence. Thus, in order to analyze 
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why this dispute is so inflammatory, Van Evera’s first hypothesis must be examined and 
a detailed discussion of the history of the dispute must be made. 
The Han and the Uyghurs differ greatly on the historical governance of China 
over Xinjiang, which has ultimately led to the escalation of the conflict between the two 
groups. The Uyghur’ are culturally and ethnically tied to the larger nomadic Turkic 
populations of Central Asia who migrated to Xinjiang over a thousand years ago. On the 
other hand, Beijing has long declared that Xinjiang has been part of a greater “China” for 
thousands of years—and therefore, belonged to the Chinese long before the Uyghur’s 
settled there. Conversely, the Uyghurs insist that Chinese governance did not arrive in 
Xinjiang until the eighteenth century. Frederick Starr in the book “Xinjiang” declares that 
history is on the side of the Uyghurs, concluding “until the eighteenth century no Chinese 
dynasty had continuously controlled for any length of time…the entire territory [of 
Xinjiang]…[therefore] current Chinese claims that Xinjiang has been part of China for 
5,000 years have only rhetoric on their side.”49 Starr declares that imperial Chinese rule 
over Xinjiang did not come to Xinjiang until the conquest over the region by the Qing 
Empire in 1759. Consequently, he contends that while China’s historical claims may be 
exaggerated, Beijing’s control of the region “does not have to be ancient to be 
significant…[because the Qing] conquest established the mechanisms of control…that 
have characterized Chinese attitudes toward Xinjiang ever since.”50 Ultimately, Starr 
concludes that before the Qing conquest, formal governance over Xinjiang was 
essentially non-existent, and thus it was the Manchus (and thereafter their successors the 
Chinese) who legally established the political structure that became Xinjiang province.  
Taylor Fravel, however, contends that the Qing exhibited very little administrative 
control over Xinjiang and that the province was “ruled as a military colony and was not 
integrated into the centralized provincial system of administration.”51 Fravel is correct; 
for over the first century of Qing control over Xinjiang, the province had no formal 
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administrative ties to Beijing, and was simply an imperial territory somewhat akin to a 
British colony during the same time period. This is mostly due to internal debates within 
the Qing court over the strategic value of Xinjiang, with some officials bemoaning the 
lack of agricultural worth of the region that they dubbed a “barren wasteland,” while 
other officials believed the region served as a “vital buffer…[to protect] against invasion 
from the west.”52 Ultimately, the strategic buffer that Xinjiang was seen to provide 
overrode Qing concerns over its seeming lack of agricultural value and the region 
remained under Qing control not as a tributary, but as a “special administrative zone” 
overseen by military commanders and “soldiers [who] worked fields adjoining their 
garrisons.”53  
Therefore, it is clear the Qing had a tremendous influence in shaping the political 
infrastructure of Xinjiang. Through various unique policies, the Qing laid the foundation 
for the transition of Xinjiang from a Qing military colony to a formally administrated 
province of Qing China by 1884.54 In its incorporation of Xinjiang, Starr highlights four 
essential policies the Qing instituted that dramatically shaped the political trajectory of 
the region. First, the Qing immediately replaced the traditional tribal and nomadic rule 
that had existed over the region for centuries with a “Chinese-style administration 
system.” Secondly, in so doing, the Qing replaced the “local Turkic…princes and 
Manchu and Mongol military officials” that had ruled the area with a “solidly ethnic Han 
officialdom,” which entrenched Qing dominance over the region. Third, the Qing 
instituted a large Han Chinese immigration to the region, a policy that would be repeated 
again by the CCP in the second half of the twentieth century. Lastly, the Qing pushed for 
the “cultural assimilation” of the local population “through Confucian education.”55 All 
of these policies cemented Qing governance over the region and helped lay the 
foundation for the territory’s official administration into Qing China in 1884. 
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Following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911the new Chinese Republic lost a 
measure of control over Xinjiang. After Yuan Shikai took control over the government in 
Beijing, Yang Zengxin took control of Urumchi, the capital of the province, leaving Yuan 
little choice but to recognize his rule over Xinjiang.56 Starr asserts that while Xinjiang 
officially remained apart of China, “Yang [merely] paid lip service to Chinese authority 
[and] ran his province as an autocracy.”57 This is not a unique situation for the post-Qing 
warlord era, for during this time, the majority of the Chinese provinces were ruled by 
independent dictators who ruled each region as his own kingdom.  
This distinctive period of quasi-independent rule in Xinjiang continued after the 
end of the warlord era as Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalists seized power. Fravel 
claims that “during the [entirety of the] Republican era…Han Chinese warlords 
controlled the area, but [ruled] in almost complete independence of [Chiang’s] 
government…[and] maintained far closer administrative and economic ties with the 
Soviet Union than with China proper.”58 Ultimately, however, Xinjiang remained under 
de-facto Chinese control despite all of the political turmoil that engulfed China in the first 
half of the twentieth century: from the fall of the Qing, to the autocratic conditions of the 
warlord state period, to the Japanese invasion, the rise and fall of Chiang and the 
Nationalists, and ultimately the rise of Mao and the CCP in 1949. Throughout it all—
unlike other frontier Chinese territories, such as Tibet and Mongolia—Xinjiang never 
declared independence from China.  
Upon assuming control of the country, the CCP faced a daunting prospect in 
defending its control over Xinjiang, particularly in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split that 
emanated between the two communist nations beginning around 1960. Mao quickly 
realized that Xinjiang remained isolated from China proper, which maintained minimal 
contact with Beijing and the majority of whose “trade was conducted with adjacent 
Soviet republics, not with the provinces of China proper.”59 The Soviet influence in the 
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region was substantial, with the majority of the local Uyghur population finding closer 
cultural, racial, and spiritual ties to the Soviets than the Han. Therefore, with the onset of 
the split with Moscow, Beijing faced a major challenge in defending its massive and 
mostly undefended border with the USSR and its satellites in Central Asia. As Fravel 
argues, the CCP believed the “USSR was deliberately seeking to destabilize” Xinjiang, 
and therefore, Beijing “moved quickly to strengthen its control of the border.”60  
Ultimately, due the tenuous diplomatic situation with Moscow, and the fear that 
they would instigate a Uyghur rebellion in order to help destabilize Chinese control in the 
region, the CCP took two successive steps in 1962 to consolidate its control in Xinjiang. 
In order to quell any Soviet influence over the Uyghur’s, Beijing first “closed all Soviet 
consulates in Xinjiang…and [then] ceased all border trade…with the Soviet Union and 
Mongolia.”61 After cutting off Soviet influence in Xinjiang, Beijing took the steps to try 
to secure their contested western border in the hopes of decreasing the availability of 
outside assistance to the Uyghurs. Seeing their disputed western border with the Soviet 
Union as a diplomatic bargaining chip, Beijing quickly worked to resolve disputes with 
its neighbors in “North Korea, Mongolia…and Afghanistan,” and in all cases, China was 
consistent in its “willingness to compromise” in its territorial claims in order to limit 
foreign intrusion in Xinjiang.62 Consequently, Beijing reached out to Moscow and while 
talks eventually “deteriorated…[and] produced no final agreement, both sides [did] reach 
a consensus on how to delimit the Chinese-Soviet border…that was almost identical to 
the agreement they signed in 1991.”63 
In the end, the Sino-Soviet split intensified and the agreement that was nearly 
reached in 1964 was shelved for nearly three decades. With the threat of a Soviet 
invasion becoming increasingly more likely in the late 1960s, Beijing fortified its military 
position and backed away from any bilateral discussions. However, the policy of 
compromise that China clearly showed in the run-up to the Sino-Soviet split—and its 
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subsequent backing away from diplomatic engagement afterwards—shows that it was the 
internal threat of rebellion in Xinjiang that ultimately influenced Beijing to compromise 
on its territorial disputes. Fravel concludes that it was “the timing of compromise efforts 
(which occurred almost simultaneously after the promulgation of the fear in Beijing of a 
Soviet-sponsored Uyghur uprising)…[that] explains why and when China 
[cooperated].”64 Ultimately, this highlights the blatant insecurity the CCP has felt in 
regard to its authority in Xinjiang, and that despite China’s claims to the contrary, the 
Uyghurs have a legitimate grievance in concern to their historical subservience to the 
Han. 
D. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW IT CONTINUES TO 
SHAPE CHINESE POLICY IN XINJIANG 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of its former 
Central Asian republics set the stage for China’s latest round of diplomatic compromise 
on its border. In the early 1990s, as former Communist governments in Eastern Europe 
and the USSR crumbled in the wake of the end of the Cold War, a new era of nationalist 
sentiment spread across the world. From Eastern Europe to Central Asia, former Soviet 
republics gained political independence, with a large percentage of the new states being 
formed around ethnic lines. While the fall of Communism brought political freedom to 
the Turkic and Persian peoples of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, it brought no 
such political governance to the Uyghurs.  
The PRC, feeling the full brunt of the anti-Communist movement with the brutal 
student protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989, moved quickly to squash the resurgent 
Uyghur calls for independence. Understanding that the stability of the regime was 
essential—particularly to maintain the momentum of the sweeping economic reforms 
occurring in China at that time—Beijing again used its disputed western border as a 
diplomatic bargaining chip to buy the allegiance of the new governments in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as kick start the three decade old discussion with 
Moscow. By again compromising on its territorial concessions, Beijing secured the 
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allegiance of the Uyghur’s most likely allies. These territorial agreements set the stage for 
the annual meetings between the nations known originally as the Shanghai Five, which 
soon resulted in the landmark foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001. As Fravel notes, the roots of Chinese 
internal insecurity regarding Xinjiang played a major role in the founding of the SCO, in 
which all the founding states “pledged a shared opposition to ‘separatism’…and 
“matched China’s objectives…to cooperate to oppose ethno-nationalist 
movements…[and] counter internal threats from pan-Islamic forces.”65 Therefore, while 
the end of the Cold War enflamed nationalist sentiment among the Uyghurs, Beijing used 
the tenuous political situation to secure new allies on their vital western border, while 
depriving the Uyghurs of their only potential external outlet of support.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, gave the Chinese further opportunity to 
marginalize the Uyghur calls for national independence. Ironically, cursed by their 
Muslim faith—during a time of widespread and reactionary anti-Muslim sentiment 
among the major powers of the world—the Uyghurs were unfairly tied to the ethnically 
Arab Islamic terrorists, whom the Uyghurs shared no similarity with other than their 
faith. Ostracized by the Chinese and ignored by the majority of the international 
community, the Uyghurs are left in the desperate situation where they cannot protest 
Chinese rule without risking being labeled a part of the ETIM and being subjected to 
Beijing’s brutal counter-terrorist measures. As Elizabeth Van Wie Davis points out in her 
essay “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang,” the tragic part is “there is no 
single Uyghur agenda,” while some are calling for an independent state of East Turkistan, 
a large percentage just wants to “maintain [their] cultural distinction within an 
autonomous relationship with China,” while another group wants to integrate further with 
Beijing.66  
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Ironically, Beijing’s policy toward the Uyghurs since 2001 has only intensified 
the violence in the region. As Sean Roberts notes, Beijing’s labeling of the Uyghur 
Separatists as terrorists has increased the potential for violence because “it could turn 
Islamic extremists against China…[and ultimately give the] relatively few Uyghur 
militants something that has thus far been elusive for them, external support.”67 
Furthermore, Roberts goes on to conclude that as the Uyghur’s become more alienated, 
Beijing’s harsh policies “could sway much more substantial popular support among [the] 
Uyghur’s toward such militants.”68 If Beijing’s ultimate goal is to maintain stability in 
the province, then backing off its harsh counter-terrorist campaign in Xinjiang may be a 
wise policy. 
Another policy the CCP has instituted in Xinjiang in order to stem anti-
government violence has been to ramp up economic assistance to the region. The CCP 
remains convinced that a major motivating factor for the anti-government demonstrations 
is the substandard economic conditions that persist in Xinjiang, especially when 
compared to the booming Chinese east coast, and that by simply pumping money into the 
region the CCP can buy the allegiance of the disenfranchised Uyghurs. This is not a new 
policy, as Beijing has long believed that the improvement of the standard of living in 
Xinjiang would help decrease the anti-government violence there, as Hao Yufan and Lui 
Weihua point out, “from 1950 to 2008, the central government invested 386.23 billion 
Yuan in Xinjiang, accounting for 25.7 percent of the total investment in the region.”69 
The numbers suggest Beijing’s economic policy in Xinjiang has been largely successful 
from the outset, with the increase of government investment and subsidies in the region 
leading to an increase in “per capita net income of famers in Xinjiang [by] 28 times more 
than that of 1978 and 1.2 times more than that of 2000 when the western development 
campaign was launched.”70  
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While central government assistance has improved the economic conditions in the 
province, a large percentage of the Uyghurs remain dissatisfied, which suggests the roots 
of the dispute are much deeper than the simple economic disparity between the Chinese 
coast and the frontier. Stan Hok-Wui Wong and Hiroki Takeuchi take this thesis a step 
further and suggest that although the region as a whole has seen increased economic 
investment, the average Uyghur farmer is not reaping the benefits. They argue that due to 
the unusual demographic conditions in Xinjiang—where a large portion of the Uyghur 
minority lives in rural areas, far from government control—economic assistance is likely 
to merely line the pockets of local government officials, and not reach the dissatisfied 
local population. Therefore, because the local government remains dominated by the 
Han, the Uyghurs are unlikely to receive the benefits of increased government 
expenditure in Xinjiang. They conclude that in situations where one ethnic group 
dominates the political process, “the social group that is excluded from the policymaking 
process [will not benefit from the] new economic opportunities brought by the 
center…[because] the social group that controls the local government has little 
incentive…to set policies that take care of the excluded group’s preferences.”71 Thus, 
while the Chinese government claims to be providing economic benefits to the Uyghurs, 
the locals—who have received none of the promised benefits—grow even angrier with 
the Chinese government, ultimately increasing the risk of violence. In the end, because 
the dispute in Xinjiang remains based on ethnic discrimination, no amount of financial 
stimulus by Beijing will quell the unrest in the region. 
All this said, the Uyghur separatist movement retains differing interpretations of 
the historical precedence of Beijing’s governance over the area and about how each 
government defines what it means to be culturally “Chinese.” Therefore, of all of the 
policies Beijing has taken in order to stem the political violence in the region, the most 
damaging of them all has come from the continued forced migration of large percentages 
of Han Chinese to Xinjiang by the CCP, and the bitterness this has created among the 
Uyghurs who feel this policy was done to shut the Uyghurs out of their own local 
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government. As Colin Mackerras asserts, the root of Uyghur unrest remains directly 
linked to “the migration of Han people to Xinjiang [since the 1950s, which] was enough 
to affect the demographic make-up of the region, giving Uighurs [sic] the feeling of 
dispossession in what they regard as their own territory.”72 Therefore, Beijing’s attempts 
to saturate the ethnic community in Xinjiang with the Han, has only increased Uyghur 
feelings of repression and further instituted the mentality of “us versus them” among the 
disassociated local population.  
The PRC has been unable to stop the steady stream of anti-government and 
separatist protests in Xinjiang because the problem is rooted in the deep-seated cultural 
differences between the Han and the Uyghurs—who see the Han as foreign colonizers of 
their land. While the memory of European imperialism remains a point of contention 
within Beijing, the policies it has undertaken to limit the political influence of the 
Uyghurs reeks of hypocrisy. As Anna Hayes concludes, the Han and the Uyghurs have a 
shared history, one of “territorial annexation and imperial aggression…[like the Han, the 
Uyghurs history] is also based on territorial annexation and imperial aggression, only in 
this instance it is by the Chinese, not European powers.”73 Therein lies the problem, the 
dispute in Xinjiang is based on a vast disagreement over national identity, and ultimately 
Beijing is left with no viable peaceful option, ergo the potential for violence in 
Xinjiang—either instigated by the Uighurs or the PLA—remains very high. 
E. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the end of the war in Iraq and the drawdown of U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan, the United States remains committed to the eradication of global terrorist 
networks. As the American Embassy attack in Benghazi in September 2012 and the 
Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 exhibit, despite the death of Osama Bin Laden 
the United States remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Therefore, it 
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remains in the best interests of the United States to pursue strong partnerships with 
foreign governments in its counter-terrorism campaign, particularly with those in the 
predominantly Muslim North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia.  
Beijing’s struggle in Xinjiang against the internationally recognized ETIM 
terrorist group presents an opportunity for the United States to cooperate with China on a 
global scale. Despite the fears of realists, such as Mearsheimer, a rising Chinese military 
can provide America with a very capable ally in its newly named Overseas Contingency 
Operations. However, the United States must be careful in its pursuit of a potential 
partnership with China on counter-terrorism. Of foremost concern to the United States is 
that it needs to ensure an already suspicious Chinese government, that counter-terrorism 
measures in Central Asia are not aimed at increasing the American military presence on 
China’s fragile western border. China already feels Washington is attempting to encircle 
them politically with its multiple bilateral alliances with nations immediately to China’s 
north, east, and south. A major U.S. presence in Central Asia would—in their eyes—
complete the circle and may cause Beijing to act more belligerently toward the United 
States. Therefore, as the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, it is important that it 
now pursue a much lighter footprint in the region, in order to reassure China that counter-
terrorism measures are not being used as an excuse to permanently pre-position large-
scale and long-term military forces in Central Asia.  
Thus, small operations forces would ultimately be used to highlight a successful 
U.S. counter-terrorism approach in the region, with the emphasis being not on projecting 
American military power, but on training and empowering the armed forces of Central 
Asia to better defeat terrorist networks in their nation. Furthermore, the United States 
should continue to reach out to their counterparts in Beijing through “good faith” 
measures, such as intelligence sharing on suspected terrorist members and groups in 
Xinjiang, as well as bilateral counter-terrorist exercises. This said, in its engagement with 
China, the United States must also be careful not to sit idly by if China continues to 
violently oppress its ethnic minorities—such as the Uyghurs—in the name of 
counterterrorism. It is important the United States make clear the difference between the 
ETIM and other Uyghur separatist organizations. The United States must work to use 
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diplomatic soft power to continue to push for the maintenance of an international 
standard for the rule of law and human rights. As Van Wie Davis concludes, the GWOT 
has led some to believe that increased counter-terrorism efforts “will lead to an increase 
in human rights abuses globally. Many of the human rights groups that watch 
Xinjiang…fear that China is using the war on terror to disregard the human rights of 
Uyghurs.”74  
Therefore, it is important for the United States to maintain vigilance in its pursuit 
of not overstretching the definition of what it means to be a “terrorist.” An in-depth look 
at the situation in Xinjiang proves the dispute is much deeper than the current Chinese 
narrative that it is merely an infiltration of sovereign Chinese territory by foreign Islamic 
extremists. Despite claims to the contrary, the Uyghurs are a distinct ethnic people who 
have been subjugated and politically underrepresented during the rule of the 
predominantly Han PRC. The CCP see the Uyghur separatists as a direct threat to regime 
stability, which is a microcosm of their nascent fears of a renewed pro-democracy 
campaign within China proper, and thus have decided to whitewash the entire Uyghur 
movement under the guise of international terrorism in an effort to quiet domestic unrest. 
Ultimately, the United States must monitor the situation very carefully because the 
“Chinese [may] worsen the problem by targeting and antagonizing nonviolent Uyghurs,” 
which may lead to a violent escalation of the conflict, or even an Islamic inspired Uyghur 
revolution.75 While Fravel’s thesis clearly shows that China’s interactions with its 
neighbors in Central Asia have favored compromise over conflict, its domestic responses 
in Xinjiang provide a more foreboding outlook to the future. Beijing has tried non-violent 
measures, such as forced immigration and economic assistance, in an attempt to satisfy 
the Uyghurs, but such efforts have not delivered the intended results. Therefore, it is 
highly likely the Chinese will resort to more aggressive means, in the name of counter-
terrorism, in order to stop the political chaos in the province. As their actions in 
Tiananmen two decades ago have shown, when regime stability is questioned, the CCP 
has no problem using military force against its own people. Thus, China’s anticipated 
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reaction to an escalation of the situation in Xinjiang can be expected to be on par with the 
government responses in Libya and Syria in recent years, and could therefore, ultimately 
threaten the peace and stability of Asia.  
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IV. AKSAI-CHIN AND THE CHINA-INDIA BORDER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the second of the three case studies discussed in this thesis, 
the burgeoning rivalry between China and India, and considers how disagreements 
regarding their disputed border could lead to a second iteration of the Sino-Indian border 
war of 1962. This chapter discusses the historical background of the territorial dispute, as 
well as provides an analysis of the causes and repercussions of the short one-month war, 
and addresses whether the legacy of that war has had any effect on current Chinese 
foreign policy in the region. In so doing, this thesis examines competing hypotheses by 
Taylor Fravel and Brahma Chellaney regarding China’s motivations for launching 
military operations against India in 1962, and discusses how those motivations play a 
factor in China’s current foreign policy regarding India. Therefore, this chapter will also 
analyze China’s recent actions along the Indian border—including PLA incursions into 
Indian territory in the spring of 2013—and asks whether China’s actions are a prelude to 
a future military operation against India, aimed at reclaiming “lost” Chinese territory. 
Additionally, this chapter discusses the potential implications for U.S. foreign policy in 
the region if there is an uptick in hostility between Beijing and New Delhi, and finally it 
also analyzes competing hypotheses debating whether a Sino-Indian rivalry would 
actually provide positive benefits for the United States, while also discussing who 
Washington would ultimately support if the recent border tensions between the two 
nations were to escalate into a large scale war. Accordingly, this chapter concludes that 
the United States must continue to engage both China and India politically and 
economically, and must work diligently in order to avoid either nation. Ultimately, the 
United States can benefit from strategic competition between New Delhi and Beijing, but 
it must be careful not to encourage the situation too overtly or it risks alienating either of 
the two rising Asian powers.  
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B. BACKGROUND AND COMPETING HYPOTHESES REGARDING 
FUTURE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS 
As the summer of 2013 drew to a close, China and India found themselves at a 
crossroads in their bilateral relationship as recent tensions along their disputed border led 
to diplomatic friction between the two Asian powers. As political hostilities have 
flared—particularly after the PLA’s recent incursions into the Indian administered region 
of Arunachal Pradesh in mid-August76—there has been increasing concern that the 
world’s two most populous nations might find themselves on a debilitating diplomatic 
spiral that may lead to war. A potential conflict between the large nations, heightened by 
the possession of nuclear weapons by both, may present a daunting prospect for the 
United States as it looks to maintain regional stability in Asia.  
The central issue in the Sino-Indian border dispute is the infamous “McMahon 
line” agreement between Great Britain and Tibet in 1914, which effectively established 
the border between India and present-day China. India recognizes this line as its official 
border, but the Chinese continue to contest this agreement on the basis that Tibet had no 
sovereign right to sign to the treaty.77 Separated by the Tibetan plateau and the massive 
Himalayan mountain range, China and India had little political contact until after Tibet 
was annexed by the PRC in 1951. However, after absorbing Tibet, China began to 
question India’s territorial claims along its border, which ultimately became a driving 
force in the brief 1962-border war. Despite the resounding Chinese victory in 1962, the 
border remained contested well after the resumption of diplomatic relations after Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976. Despite the renewal of diplomatic relations and the resumption 
of negotiations “to resolve their border disputes” in 1981, there has been little traction in 
diplomatic talks. While Braham Chellaney points out that while the “two sides have 
signed three vaunted border related accords [in 1993, 1996, and 2005]…negotiations 
[regarding the settlement of the border] stand deadlocked.”78 Thus, even after three 
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decades of ongoing deliberation and negotiations, the Chinese and Indian positions 
regarding their contested border have changed very little since the 1962 border war. 
Therefore, Chellaney argues that as China’s military continues to gain strength and 
influence in Asia, it has begun to rebuild infrastructure along the Indian border while also 
preparing military assets to be deployed to the disputed regions of Aksai-Chin and 
Arunachal Pradesh in order to give it greater flexibility if tensions with New Delhi 
escalate. Consequently, Chellaney concludes, “by building new railroads, airports and 
highways in Tibet, China is now in a position to rapidly move additional forces to the 
border to potentially strike at India at a time of its choosing.”79 Taking Chellaney’s thesis 
to heart, it would seem that China’s deployment of troops to Arunachal Pradesh in 
August might signal that aggressive action by Beijing to re-take the disputed region may 
occur in the near future.  
This said, the presence of increasing economic interdependence in the form of 
bilateral trade between China and India, may act as a counterweight to any underlying 
reasons for conflict between the two nations. As Bruce Russett and John Oneal conclude 
in their book Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International 
Organizations, “countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the 
global economy…have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution.”80 
Dubbed economic interdependence theory, the crux of Russett and Oneal’s theory is that 
two countries that have strong economic ties are highly unlikely to go to war out of fear 
of disrupting the mutually beneficial economic relationship. With this theory in mind, 
there is considerable weight behind the idea that China and India are unlikely to let 
border tensions disrupt their burgeoning economic relationship by going to war. 
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increasing their economic ties as “bilateral trade [between the two] rose by about a third 
to nearly $76 billion [in 2012]…and the countries hope to boost this trade to $100 billion 
by 2015.”81  
The growing bilateral trade between China and India may encourage Beijing and 
New Delhi to avoid an escalation of a territorial dispute, however, it would be foolhardy 
to assume that conflict will not occur at some point in the future between the two nations 
just because of economic ties. John Mearsheimer, in his essay, “The Gathering Storm: 
China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” argues that power and influence are key to 
motivating states actions and that “economic interdependence does not have a significant 
effect on geopolitics one way or the other.”82 Mearsheimer concludes by referencing the 
fact that the nations in Europe “were all highly interdependent and prospering in 1914,” 
yet they ended up going to war anyway.83  
Whether territorial disagreements or economic interdependence plays a larger role 
in determining the volatility of Sino-Indian relations in the coming years is anyone’s 
guess. However, it is paramount for the United States to understand the historical roots of 
the recent surge in tensions. With a greater understanding of the underlying causes of the 
rift, the United States can better anticipate if China’s recent actions really are a dark 
harbinger of coming aggression as Chellaney’s thesis would suggest.  
C. HISTORICAL CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT AND THE 1962 BORDER 
WAR  
Despite being two of the most ancient societies in all of Asia, the Chinese and the 
Indians had very little political contact until the twentieth century, due to the vast 
mountainous Himalayan mountain regions and the Tibetan plateau, which had long 
served as a buffer between the two societies.84 Thus, when the CCP rose to power after  
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the Chinese Civil War and subsequently annexed Tibet in 1951, bringing Chinese troops 
to the Indian border for the first time in nearly two centuries, it marked the beginning of 
an official Chinese and Indian diplomatic relationship.  
Ironically, despite Chinese aggression in Tibet, New Delhi was one of the first 
countries to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC. India, which had only gained 
independence from Britain a couple years before in 1947, saw in China a “benign 
neighbor that had, like India, only recently emerged from the ravages of colonialism.”85 
Therefore, despite the vast cultural and political differences between the two nations, 
New Delhi hoped to find in Beijing a kindred spirit with whom it could establish friendly 
diplomatic and economic ties. This desire for friendship with Beijing led India to deny a 
vote in the “United Nations General Assembly in November 1950 on the then-
independent Tibet’s appeal for international help against Chinese aggression,” despite the 
fact that in doing so New Delhi was giving up its strategically important land buffer with 
China.86  
Furthermore, in order to solidify an Indian and Chinese friendship, Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed in 1954 “a largely one-sided pact with Beijing…under 
the rubric…[of] ‘five principles’ of peaceful coexistence.”87 Dubbed the Panchsheel 
Agreement, this treaty included “a formal Indian recognition of the new Chinese control 
over Tibet, with India formally forfeiting all the extraterritorial rights and privileges it 
had enjoyed in Tibet until the Chinese invasion.”88 Despite relinquishing all claims of 
sovereignty within Tibet to Beijing, India received nothing from this treaty outside of a 
vague promise of friendship from Beijing. Ironically, “India’s formal acceptance of the 
Chinese claim over Tibet came without extracting a reciprocal Chinese acceptance of the 
then prevailing Indo-Tibetan border.”89 Chellaney argues that ultimately, despite its 
benevolent intentions, the Panchsheel Agreement set into motion the events that would 
                                                 
85 Elleman et al., Beijing’s Power and China’s Borders, 48. 
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid., 49.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid., 50.  
 42 
lead the two nations to war eight years later, for “no sooner had the Panchsheel 
Agreement been signed than China laid claim to some Indian frontier areas and then 
furtively intruded south of two mountain passes specified as border points in that 
accord.”90 As relations between Beijing and New Delhi intensified over this overt breach 
of agreement, China prepared its troops to forcibly seize territory in the disputed regions 
along the McMahon line, which culminated in China’s invasion of India in October 1962. 
The war itself was brief and resulted in a sweeping victory for the Chinese. China, 
having the superior military forces and the element of surprise, decimated the Indian 
forces along the border and solidified its administration over Aksai-Chin—which 
possessed significant strategic value to Beijing because the only major highway 
connecting Tibet to Xinjiang ran through Aksai-Chin. After achieving its strategic 
objectives, China announced a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, 1962 after only 
thirty-two days of fighting.91  
Five decades later, the legacy of the one-month long war continues to resonate in 
Sino-Indian border relations. Chellaney argues that China decided to launch the invasion 
of India because the world was distracted by the Cuban Missile Crisis, and quotes PRC 
premier Zhou Enlai’s infamous declaration that “the war was intended to teach India a 
lesson,” as an example of Beijing’s callousness.92 Exactly what that lesson is remains 
unclear, though Chellaney clearly infers that the lesson is not to trust China. 
Consequently, India, which had reached out so openly for friendship with China, was 
shocked and dismayed by China’s aggression in 1962. Reviewing Prime Minister 
Nehru’s sentiments on the day of the Chinese invasion, it is clear why a legacy of distrust 
between the Chinese and the Indians remain to this day. After the Chinese launched their 
assault, Nehru decried “there are not many instances in history where one country has 
gone out of her way to be friendly and cooperative with the government…of another 
country and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then that country returns 
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evil for good.”93 Therefore, Chellaney concludes that the legacy of this betrayal will 
continue to hamper the Sino-Indian political relationship for many years. 
An alternative analysis of the causes and implications of the 1962 border war is 
provided in Taylor Fravel’s book, Strong Borders Secure Nations. In his analysis, Fravel 
argues that China had little desire to go to war with India, because its policy of 
diplomatic negotiations had resulted in the one sided Panchsheel Agreement. Ultimately, 
however, Fravel declares that aggressive actions by India in the disputed regions forced 
China’s hand. Fravel mentions that as late as Apri1 960, China was prepared “to 
negotiate a settlement…[presenting India] a ‘package deal’ in which each side would 
recognize the disputed land held by the other. China would keep Aksai Chin…and India 
would retain…territory south of the McMahon Line in the east.”94 Unfortunately, Fravel 
argues India sensed that China’s strength regarding its territorial claim in Aksai-Chin was 
declining, and thus, New Delhi rejected the Chinese proposal and decided in 1961 to push 
Beijing for a better deal. Fravel contends, “by late 1961, India sought to strengthen its 
position in what became termed the ‘forward policy’ of increasing its military presence in 
disputed territory…[while maintaining] a diplomatic stance of refusing to negotiate.”95 
Ultimately, Fravel concludes that China’s own perception of its declining position of 
strength in the territorial dispute coupled with the increase of Indian military presence in 
the disputed region led China to decide that the use of force was the only way to achieve 
its political objectives.  
Therefore, China’s willingness to use force…has varied with perceptions 
of decline in its claim strength and bargaining power in the 
dispute…Decline in claim strength corresponds with decisions to use force 
in 1962, 1967, and 1986. By contrast, during periods of stable claim 
strength in the 1970s and since the 1990s, China has refrained from using 
force.96  
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Thus, Fravel contends that despite the fact that Chinese launched the initial assault, it was 
actually Indian aggression that forced China’s hand to use military force. Therefore, 
history has shown that China is most dangerous when it feels that it has lost the 
bargaining power to settle a dispute diplomatically. Thus, it remains in India’s best 
interests not to antagonize the Chinese and to continue to reach for a mutually beneficial 
resolution of the territorial dispute. 
Despite a renewal of diplomatic relations after Mao’s death and a resumption of 
border negotiations in 1981, the two sides remain steadfast in their determination not to 
compromise along their shared border. Chellaney declares in his essay, “Rising Powers, 
Rising Tensions” that this constitutes “the longest and most fruitless negotiating process 
between any two nations in modern world history,” and that neither the Chinese nor the 
Indians believe a resolution in the near future is forthcoming. Referring to PRC Premier 
Wen Jiabo’s comments in 2010 declaring that any resolution of the disputes “will take a 
fairly long period of time,” Chellaney openly wonders, “What does China (or India) gain 
by carrying on the border negotiations?”97  
Chellaney believes that recent Chinese incursions into the disputed regions, as 
well as its renewed claims on Arunachal Pradesh, mirror Chinese actions in the months 
leading up to the 1962 border war. Thus, Chellaney concludes that a rapid escalation of 
the conflict may occur in the near term. Fravel’s thesis, on the other hand, suggests that 
China’s moves to secure its position in Aksai-Chin while increasing rhetoric regarding 
Arunachal Pradesh signifies that China is merely looking to increase its bargaining 
position, and as long as India does not instigate political tensions by increasing its 
military position along the border there remains a real possibility of progress in 
diplomatic negotiations. A closer look at China’s recent actions along the contested 
border is necessary to determine whether Chellaney or Fravel’s thesis carries more 
weight in this instance. 
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D. ASSESSING RECENT CHINESE ACTIONS: RENEWED CHINESE 
AGGRESSION?  
Chellaney argues that China’s recent resurgence in its territorial claims over 
Arunachal Pradesh—punctuated by the alleged movement of PLA troops to the region—
mirrors its annexation of Tibet in 1951 and its movement into Aksai-Chin during the 
1962 border war. Chellaney declares that China greatly desires the rich water resources in 
Arunachal Pradesh, and aims to “build a dam near the Tibet-Arunachal border that would 
be more than twice as large as the Three Gorges Dam.”98 Ultimately, by moving troops 
to the disputed region, Beijing wants to force India to accept the region as a part of China 
like it did with Tibet over 50 years ago. Therefore, Chellaney contends that this ties 
directly to “China’s long-standing negotiating stance: what it occupies is Chinese 
territory, and what it claims must be shared…through a settlement based on mutual 
accommodation and…understanding.”99 Chellaney’s description of this very “passive-
aggressive” Chinese diplomatic position suggests China is looking to take advantage of 
India’s unwillingness to escalate the dispute into open warfare. 
In contending that Chinese aggression against India is on the rise, Chellaney lists 
several areas that indicate China is looking to bully India into acquiescing in its territorial 
claims. Firstly, Chellaney points to an increase in Chinese media pressure on India. 
Describing the increase of criticism of India by China’s state-run newspaper, The 
People’s Daily, which berated India’s “recklessness and arrogance” regarding the 
territorial disputes, Chellaney contends that this represents a “throwback to the coarse 
rhetoric China used in the buildup to war in 1962.”100 Secondly, Chellaney contends that 
China is looking to “build pressure on New Delhi over Kashmir” where the PLA has 
boosted its presence in the disputed region by increasing PLA deployments and funding 
strategic projects, such as infrastructure building in the area.101 Lastly, Chellaney 
declares that all of this has come with an increase in suspicion within India over China 
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deliberately arming Kashmir-based Islamic militants.102 In response to these recent 
Chinese incursions, India has reacted exactly as Fravel would not advise, “by 
strengthening its military deployments in Arunachal Pradesh…to prevent any [future] 
Chinese land-grab.”103 Thus, as negotiations regarding their contested border continue to 
stagnate, and as both China and India increase their military presence within the region, a 
violent escalation of the dispute similar to the situation in 1962 remains a possibility. 
This time however, with advanced military capabilities on both sides of the McMahon 
line, including the looming presence of nuclear weapons, a second iteration of the Sino-
Indian war figures to be much more catastrophic.  
Despite the dire predictions of nuclear warfare, it is important to note that despite 
an ongoing territorial dispute between India and China for over fifty years, the situation 
has not escalated to open warfare since the announcement of the cease-fire in November 
1962. Furthermore, despite renewed antagonism on both sides regarding Arunachal 
Pradesh, the major factor in Sino-Indian diplomatic relations remains their ever-
increasing economic cooperation. As economic interdependence theory suggests, the 
financial costs of a war over Aksai-Chin and Arunachal Pradesh will greatly outweigh 
any strategic gain caused by the war. Furthermore, the daunting prospect of losing the 
war, and therefore losing the strategic territory while also severely damaging the 
economic relationship should serve as a sizeable deterrent to an escalation of tensions. As 
Fravel implies, Chinese military maneuvers within the disputed regions should not be 
viewed as a harbinger of future military aggression, but actually represents a process of 
solidifying political bargaining chips in anticipation of future diplomatic negotiations. 
Therefore, China’s recent actions along the McMahon line should be a sign to New Delhi 
that it is open to revisiting its 1960 territorial proposal. Whether India accepts this 
proposal or not is debatable, but growing economic ties between the two nations should 
keep the conflict from spiraling out of control.  
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E. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
While war between India and China remains highly unlikely in the near term, an 
increase in strategic rivalry between the two rising Asian nations does remain a distinct 
possibility. Ignoring their territorial dispute, it is important to note that these are two 
rising economies who reside in very close proximity of each other. Furthermore, both 
countries are vying for increased strategic power and influence in Asia, which seems to 
suggest that there will at least be some level friendly competition between the two nations 
in the coming years. How the United States responds to an increase in competition 
between the two nations is a question subject for debate.  
There is little question that the United States, eager to balance China’s rising 
power in Asia, has long seen the rising Indian democracy as a potential counterweight to 
Chinese influence. India, “which sees itself as a bridge between the West and the East, 
[and] shares basic values more with Europe than with China,” thus represents a huge 
potential ally for the West if China ever decides to become more aggressive in Asia.104 
However, India’s long-standing policy of diplomatic independence, coupled with the 
United States strategic relationship with Pakistan, has further complicated Washington’s 
efforts to reach out to India. Furthermore, the United States increasing economic 
interdependence with Beijing has caused some analysts to question whether the United 
States would actually side with India if New Delhi were to find itself in a hypothetical 
war with China.  
While China and the United States are not stated enemies, there is little doubt that 
they are fast becoming competitors for political, economic, and military influence in 
Asia. Evoking the old adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” an Indian challenge 
to China may ultimately produce tangible benefits to Washington. As Evan Braden 
Montgomery argues in his essay, “Competitive Strategies against Continental Powers: 
The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Relations,” the United States stands to benefit 
greatly from a Sino-Indian rivalry. Declaring that the United States biggest concern 
regarding China’s military rise focuses on their development of naval and space 
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technology, Montgomery argues that an uptick in hostility between China and India 
would allow “Washington [to] exploit the geographic asymmetry…by ensuring that 
Beijing continues to confront land-based security challenges.”105 Therefore, an increase 
in tensions along the Sino-Indian border would force Beijing to divert economic assets to 
land-based military technology, and away from the naval and aerospace arena, that 
concerns American military strategies the most. Thus, while the United States should not 
encourage open hostility between Beijing and New Delhi, it does stand to benefit from an 
underlying distrust between the two neighbors. Maintaining superiority in naval and 
aerospace missions is a critical element in deterring a rise in Chinese aggression in Asia. 
Therefore, if Beijing is forced to divert necessary funds away from these programs and 
toward land forces, the United States should be able to continue its leading role in the 
Pacific.  
The worst-case scenario for the United States would be if tensions between India 
and China were ever to destabilize to the point that war erupts. The 1962 war had little 
strategic effect on the United States because of its limited scope. As Chellaney notes, the 
United States was obviously distracted by the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, and 
thus, paid little heed to China’s invasion of India. A similar incident in 2013 would have 
much larger strategic consequences for the United States. While the United States will 
quietly celebrate an increased rivalry between India and China, it certainly does not want 
the two nations to go to war. Rehashing the economic interdependence debate, it is clear 
that the United States has deep economic ties to both nations, and a subsequent war 
between the two would hurt American economic interests in the region. Furthermore, 
while the United States has openly championed India’s successful democracy and clearly 
sees New Delhi as a potential balancer against Chinese assertiveness, it is debatable 
whether the United States would even support India in a war with China, and may in fact 
inwardly support Beijing. Chellaney certainly argues this point by declaring that the 
United States is “becoming Sino-centric,” and that President Barak Obama’s 
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administration “has kept mum on the Sino-Indian border tensions, instead of cautioning 
Beijing against any attempt to forcibly change existing frontiers.”106 
In conclusion, it remains evident that the Sino, Indian, and American diplomatic 
triangle remains a challenging predicament for American foreign policy in the near 
future. Attempting to balance increasing economic ties to the two Asian nations, while 
also positioning itself for a potential increase in tensions with China in the Pacific, the 
United States must be careful not to overstep its bounds by pushing for a more assertive 
New Delhi. India remains reluctant to increase its security ties with the United States, 
outside of joint-military exercises, and New Delhi’s concerns over Washington’s lasting 
loyalty in regards to China and Pakistan will complicate American efforts to increase ties 
with India as a balance to China. Consequently, as Montgomery concludes, the United 
States can benefit from Chinese and Indian tensions, even if it is just as an independent 
observer. In the end, it is paramount that the United States embraces any way to divert 
Chinese advancements in military technology away from naval and aerospace missions. 
Therefore, the current American foreign policy approach to attempt to foster relations 
with India while also pursuing continued economic and political engagement with China 
remains the best course for the near future.  
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V. THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the third of the three case studies discussed in this thesis—
the bitter dispute between the PRC and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands—and 
discusses the probability that increased tensions between the two Asian powers could 
draw the United States into war. This chapter surveys the historical roots of China’s 
territorial claim over the Japanese administered islands, while also discussing the political 
debate between China and Japan regarding Tokyo’s claims that the islands were Terra 
Nullis (belonged to no one) prior to its occupation in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, 
this chapter also compares three competing hypotheses from Krista Wiegand, Unryu 
Suganuma, and Taylor Fravel concerning China’s foreign policy regarding 
Diaoyu/Senkaku and whether—based on China’s past actions—a resolution of this 
conflict is plausible or not. Lastly, this chapter discusses the potential implications for 
U.S. foreign policy in the region if tensions between China and Japan over 
Diaoyu/Senkaku continues to escalate, and examines the influence of the 1952 United 
States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in regards to Tokyo’s and 
Beijing’s policies over the islands. Lastly, this chapter discusses the potential pitfalls to 
peace in the dispute and provides policy recommendations for Washington in an effort to 
keep this conflict from escalating into war. Accordingly, this chapter concludes that in 
order to achieve a peaceful solution to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, the United 
States must continue to stress to both Beijing and Tokyo the great benefits of mutual 
development over the islands natural resources. Therefore, the United States must 
continue to work through existing international institutions and bilateral discussions in 
order to put aside the competing historical claims of ownership of the islands and instead 
focus future discussions toward mutual economic benefits.107 
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B. BACKGROUND  
At the center of the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands are natural resources. While the islands themselves are relatively insignificant and 
uninhabitable, control of the islands means exclusive control over the waters surrounding 
the islands. As Zhongqi Pan points out in his article, “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” 
dispute over the islands intensified in 1968 when “a report of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East suggested possible large hydrocarbon 
deposits in the waters off Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.”108 The potential access to the natural 
resources in the waters surrounding the Senkakus is staggering, as Krista Wiegand points 
out in her book Enduring Territorial Disputes: “a 2005 estimate of oil resources in the 
East China Sea is 100 to 200 billion barrels, [which is] enough to provide energy sources 
to either [China or Japan] for fifty to eighty years.”109 Consequently, Pan argues that:  
Sovereignty over the islets could affect 40,000 km2 of surrounding 
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) area… Given both 
China and Japan’s increasing voracious appetite for energy, natural 
resources, particular the possibility of the hydrocarbon potential of the 
seabed surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, are understandably 
regarded as central in the dispute.110 
Ultimately, the financial benefits of exclusive drilling rights in the Senkakus has 
enflamed tensions between China and Japan over ownership of the islands and is the 
primary factor in regards to the high potential for conflict between the two nations. 
This said, outside of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, perhaps no other territorial 
dispute has a greater proclivity for leading to conflict than the quarrel between China and 
Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The dispute, which has festered for the past four 
decades, has intensified since September 2012 “after Japan’s government bought three of 
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the five unoccupied islands in the chain from a private owner.”111 The Japanese 
government declared the move was done “to block a proposal” by Tokyo Governor 
Shintaro Ishihara—a prominent Japanese nationalist— “to buy and develop the islands” 
in an attempt to end the territorial dispute with Beijing.112 The purchase of the islands by 
the Japanese government greatly angered the PRC—which has long declared that the 
islands have belonged to China since the Ming Dynasty—and prompted Beijing into 
increasing its air and naval presence around the disputed islands. As Hannah Beech’s 
article, “Angry Skies: Japanese Jets Scramble as Tensions With China Escalate” notes, 
“over the past year, Chinese warships have made historic forays into waters near the 
contested islands, as have flotillas of Chinese coast-guard vessels,” as China has ramped 
up its military operations in the vicinity of the Senkakus in protest of Tokyo’s occupation 
of the territory.113 Due to the heightened Chinese and Japanese military presence around 
the islands, the potential for conflict—even accidental—has increased significantly.  
Conversely, as discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis, China’s growing 
economy—which is becoming more entrenched into the international market as it 
expands globally—provides a great incentive for Beijing not to escalate the conflict. 
Similar to its relationship with India, China has significantly increased its economic ties 
and trade relations with Tokyo over the past decade. This growing economic 
interdependence between China and Japan should conceivably encourage Beijing and 
Tokyo not to go to war over the disputed islands, for as Bruce Russett and John Oneal 
argue, “countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global 
economy…have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution.”114 With 
this in mind, Mark J. Valencia concludes in his essay, “The East China Sea Dispute: 
Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” that “a compromise—joint 
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development [of the islands by China and Japan]—is motivated by the realization that a 
positive China-Japan relationship is simply too important to be destroyed by these 
disputes.”115  
Ultimately, whether conflict or compromise prevails in this dispute is highly 
dependent on the politicians within Tokyo and Beijing and whether they prioritize 
economic interdependence over nationalist ideals. Therefore, in any analysis of this 
dispute, an examination of rising popular nationalism must be made, with specific 
attention paid to the increased influence of Japanese nationalists after Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s landmark victory in the September 2012 and July 2013 Japanese 
Parliamentary elections. Since reassuming power—after a five year hiatus—Abe has 
ramped up nationalist sentiments within Japan, including attempting to “remove 
constitutional barriers to Japan’s right to collective defense and to transform Japan’s Self-
Defense Forces into ‘National Defense Forces’…[all] against the backdrop of an 
increasingly nationalistic tone of foreign policy debate in Japan.”116 The preservation of 
Japanese administration over the Senkakus is a primary concern for Japanese nationalists, 
such as Abe, and thus, a more nationalist Japanese political leadership may be more 
willing to use military force in order to defend what it deems as sovereign Japanese 
territory. Consequently, rising nationalism within Japan has intensified anti-Japanese 
sentiment within the domestic population of China, who fear Japanese nationalists are 
attempting to reverse six decades of Japanese pacifism and restore Japanese Imperial 
power. Therefore, growing nationalism within Japan and China may eventually prove to 
be counterproductive to the increasing economic ties between Tokyo and Beijing, and 
could ultimately increase the likelihood of conflict between the two nations.  
Lastly, unlike the other two cases examined in this thesis, the United States has a 
major stake in any future conflict between China and Japan. Tokyo represents 
Washington’s closest ally in Asia, and as the U.S. government seeks to increase its 
influence in the burgeoning Asia-Pacific region with its “pivot to the Pacific,” the 
                                                 
115 Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” 
Asian Perspective Seoul 31, no. 1 (2007): 127.  
116 Tsuneo Akaha, “The Return of an Unscrupulous Japan,” The Asahi Shinbum, July 16, 2013, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/forum/politics_and_economy/east_asia/AJ201307160021.  
 55 
continued peace and stability within the region becomes even more paramount. 
Ultimately, the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
underscores Washington’s commitment to Japan’s defense if it is attacked, and the 
United States has declared that the treaty covers the defense of the islands. This past 
April, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel declared that Washington “opposes any 
unilateral or coercive action that seeks to undermine Japan’s…control…[and while the 
U.S.] does not take a position on the…sovereignty of the islands…we do recognize they 
are under the administration of Japan and fall under our security treaty obligations.”117 
Therefore, Washington’s commitment to Japan’s defense remains strong, and in the event 
of military conflict over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, it can be expected that the United 
States will be compelled to intervene in support of its closest Asian ally. Therefore, it 
remains in the best interest of the United States to keep the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island 
dispute from escalating into military conflict. 
C. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE DISPUTE 
The crux of the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island 
srests in each nation’s interpretation over who first laid claim to the islands. The Chinese 
contend that the islands—which they call the Diaoyu Islands—have been an integral part 
of “China” since the Ming dynasty, and Japan’s annexation of the islands in 1895 was an 
illegal act that represented a “gross encroachment upon China’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.”118 Conversely, the core of Tokyo’s claim to the islands rests on the legal 
principle of Terra Nullius (the islands originally belonged to no one). As Zhongqi Pan 
argues, “Japan justifies its sovereignty claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by evoking 
international law concerning how terra nullius becomes a specific state’s territory.”119 
Pan’s contention is that the Japanese believe that because no one previously had 
inhabited the islands, they were openly available for Japanese annexation.120 Therefore, 
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in order to accurately account for whose claim to the islands has further credence, an 
analysis of China’s historical legacy in the Senkakus is necessary. 
As Krista Wiegand points out in Enduring Territorial Disputes, China’s historical 
claim to the islands has precedent for there is significant “evidence of the islands being 
used as early as 1372 by [Chinese] sea captains as nautical reference points, and as part 
of the coastal defense system during the Ming…and Qing Dynasty.”121 Han-yi Shaw 
concurs with Wiegand’s sentiment in his book, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute, 
in which he declares that there is “much evidence from Chinese, Ryukyuan, and Japanese 
historical records that demonstrate that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku were traditionally 
recognized as Chinese territory by all three countries.”122 Shaw argues that the basis of 
China’s claim began after the Ryukyu Kingdom became a Ming tributary state in 1372. 
Due to the beginning of this diplomatic relationship, the Chinese emperor sent envoys to 
the Ryukyu Kingdom on multiple “investiture missions.”123 Over the course of these 
missions, the Chinese envoys were required to compose detailed “mission reports” where 
they “recorded the route they took to reach the Ryukyu Kingdom.”124 These reports 
provided detailed and specific reference to the discovery of the uninhabited 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which forms the basis of the Chinese claim of sovereignty over 
the islands. Consequently, Shaw contends that “not only do these reports demonstrate that 
the disputed islands were first discovered and used by the Chinese as navigational aids 
over a period of about five hundred years…they [also] contained passages indicating 
Chinese ownership of the islands.”125 Furthermore, Shaw points out that in addition to 
being traditionally recognized by its neighbors as sovereign Chinese territory, both Ming 
and Qing China “displayed state authority over the disputed islands through effective 
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control.”126 The central point of Shaw’s argument is that the islands clearly meant more 
to Ming and Qing China than its utility as a navigational aid for Chinese sailors, because 
“the disputed islands were incorporated into the Chinese naval defence [sic] system 
beginning from the Ming…and lasting well into the Qing dynasty.”127 Ultimately, 
Shaw’s contention is that the historical evidence provides ample proof that “the islands 
were considered Chinese territory…[and that] China’s title over [the islands] was 
perfected by its official and exclusive usage of [the islands].”128 
While opponents of China’s historical claim question the relevance of Ming 
China’s use of the islands as navigational aids as fundamental proof of Chinese 
ownership of the islands, Shaw argues that “given the remoteness and inhabitability of 
these islands in pre-modern times, what more could Imperial China have done to display 
its ownership…other than…[use] them as navigational aids…and military posts?”129 
Shaw concludes that the mere ability of the Chinese to use these islands as navigational 
aids and naval anchorages is evidence enough to prove Japanese and Ryukyu acceptance 
of Chinese sovereignty over Diaoyu/Senkaku because “China would…not have been able 
to randomly deploy its naval ships at its own discretion to territories recognized as 
belonging to [Ryukyu] or Japan without stirring agitation among them.”130 Therefore, in 
regards to China’s historical claims of ownership of the islands, Wiegand and Shaw 
believe the facts back up the Chinese claim. 
Consequently, what happened to cause China to lose authority over the islands? 
Unryu Suganuma argues in his book, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-
Japanese Relations, that China became its own greatest enemy by initially denying 
western attempts to open its ports up to international trade, highlighted by the Qianlong 
emperor’s decision in 1793 to reject the McCartney mission.131 Suganuma contends that 
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“because of the slow Chinese response [to modernization], many Chinese territories were 
lost by signing unequal treaties [as a result of Chinese military inferiority],” and 
consequently, because of the chaos that engulfed China during the end of the 19th 
century as a result of the loss of China’s political power, “the Chinese people of the 
twentieth century virtually forgot over half a millennium of the history of the…islands, 
including the fact that their ancestors discovered them, used them as navigation aids, 
[and] defended them.”132 Suganuma concludes that this internal chaos within Qing China 
“provided a golden opportunity for the Japanese to claim sovereignty of these islands,” 
for ultimately, as China’s relative power was fading at the beginning of the 20th century, 
Japan’s power was ascending.133 
How the Japanese gained control over the islands remains the central point of the 
current debate. China’s official position regarding Japan’s occupation of the Diaoyu 
islands is “that the islands were ceded to Japan as part of the April 1895 Treaty of 
Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War, and therefore should be returned to 
China under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations…which stated that Japan must return all 
territories seized through war.”134 The Japanese, on the other hand, declare that the 
islands were not a part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki because they had already claimed 
the islands on the basis of terra nullis before the treaty was signed. To support this 
argument, Zhongqi Pan cites the following statement regarding Japan’s official position 
regarding the islands: 
From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made 
by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture 
and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was confirmed 
that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of 
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Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to 
erect a marker on the Islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands 
into the territory of Japan.135 
Ultimately, because of this fundamental difference between Tokyo and Beijing regarding 
exactly how and when the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were first incorporated under 
Japanese administrative control, the issue has found little room for compromise, and thus, 
continues to persist. 
The Japanese, for their part, insist that China’s current declaration that the islands 
should have been returned to Beijing as a result of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations 
regarding the Post-World War II world is inconsequential. Tokyo maintains that Beijing’s 
silence in regards to the signing of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, which permitted 
American jurisdiction over the islands, represents solid proof that the Chinese did not see 
the islands as historic Chinese territory. Accordingly, Zhongqi Pan declares that the 
Japanese government insists that because “China expressed no objection to the status of 
the islands being under the administration of the United States under Article III of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty clearly indicates that China did not consider the Senkaku 
Islands as part of [China].”136  
Unfortunately, for the Japanese, their position regarding China’s apparent lack of 
objection to the San Francisco Peace Treaty is false. First and foremost, the PRC—due to 
Washington’s recognition of the Republic of China as Beijing’s official government—
was not invited to attend the peace conference and was therefore not a party to its 
signing. Consequently, Pan declares that the Chinese have never accepted the terms of 
the peace treaty. He asserts that China has “never seen the…treaty as legally binding,” 
and therefore they have objected to it since its induction. Furthermore, Pan argues that 
even though China did not specifically mention the islands in their dismissal of the 
treaty’s legality, that does not mean that China ceded ownership of the islands to the 
United States—and ultimately—Japan. Pan maintains that it remains “unnecessary for 
China to enumerate its specific grievances regarding each particular article. [Therefore] 
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Japan could not take its claim to the Diaoyu Islands for granted just because China did 
not exclusively and specifically express objection” to specific articles in the treaty. 
Consequently, Pan concludes that because China saw the entire treaty in 1951 as illegal 
and unbinding, its silence regarding Diaoyu/Senkaku until the 1970s should not be seen 
as an admission of Japan’s sovereignty over the islands. 
Ultimately, whether Beijing really believed in 1951 that the islands represented 
sovereign Chinese territory or not is relatively inconsequential. The fact remains that 
after the discovery of natural resources in the seabed of the waters surrounding 
Diaoyu/Senkaku in 1968, China quickly made its position on the issue known. Due to the 
presence of the vast hydrocarbon deposits in the area, Pan contends, “the dispute came 
into the open in 1969 after the U.S. and Japan issued a Joint Statement, which led to the 
Ryukyu Reversion Agreement signed in 1971 that included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
as part of Okinawa to be returned to Japanese rule.”137 This decision infuriated the 
Chinese, who refused to accept Japanese legal authority over the islands, which would 
consequently deliver them exclusive access to the natural resources in the waters 
surround the islands. Understanding that the Ryukyu Reversion Agreement would soon 
return the islands under Japanese administration, China acted quickly to make their claim 
to the islands, and in December 1970, “formally stated that the Diaoyu Islands (and 
Taiwan) were China’s sacred territory and that exploitation of the area by foreign 
countries would not be tolerated.”138 Therefore, the issue continues to remain at an 
impasse to the present day, with neither side being able to fully utilize the resources in 
the area, out of fear of escalating the dispute into conflict. Pan concludes, “while military 
conflict between China and Japan over the islands is unlikely, so is any form of resolution 
of the dispute,” because neither side appears willing to budge in regards to their 
position.139  
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D. ANALYSIS OF THREE HYPOTHESES: WHAT’S NEXT, RESOLUTION, 
CONFLICT, OR THE STATUS QUO? 
Understanding that Japan and China remain fiercely divided regarding the legality 
of Tokyo’s current administration over the islands, it is necessary to discuss what the 
prospects for resolution—or conflict—over the islands are in the near future. In so doing, 
this section examines three competing hypotheses regarding the future volatility of the 
dispute: Unryu Suganuma’s thesis regarding the role of irredentism and how it increases 
the risk of conflict, Krista Wiegand’s argument concerning China’s history of delay and 
coercive diplomacy and how it will use its rising power to influence the dispute, and 
lastly, Taylor Fravel’s thesis concerning China’s history of compromise in its territorial 
disputes and why China has yet to compromise over the Diaoyu/Senkakus. While all 
three hypotheses concur that conflict remains at the present moment unlikely, they all 
admit the potential for escalation remains present and has increased over the last decade. 
Unryu Suganuma argues that irredentism, which he defines as “some historical 
argument in which the past discovery, occupancy, or access to the ‘land of the people’ 
takes precedence, has played the major rule in dictating the current impasse in the 
territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.140 He declares that because 
irredentism is rampant on both sides of the dispute, it has made compromise between 
Tokyo and Beijing very difficult.141 Therefore, Suganuma contends that a peaceful 
resolution to the dispute remains very unlikely in the immediate future, as both China and 
Japan continue to claim that they have historical rights to the islands. Consequently, 
because the dispute remains “rooted in the deep history of Sino-Japanese relations [due to 
their] geographical closeness…[and] complicated cultural interchange,” Suganuma 
concludes that the only way the dispute can be resolved is if Tokyo and Beijing are able 
to prioritize future mutual benefits over the “historical, geographical, and cultural 
contexts” surrounding the conflict.142  
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With this in mind, Suganuma supposes that there are only three plausible 
resolutions to the dispute. The first, and what he deems is the most likely, resolution to 
the dispute is what he labels the “Joint Development Scenario” whereby “both China 
(including Taiwan) and Japan may join together to develop the Diaoyu Islands while the 
sovereign right of the…islands is shelved.”143 Suganuma believes that this is the most 
likely scenario because “China has [already] made a proposal to jointly develop the 
islands,” ultimately he contends that all this resolution will take to occur is a Japanese 
acquiescence to shelve the dispute and agree to mutually develop the area.144 Due to the 
dispute, Tokyo has been unable to fully benefit from the natural resources present in the 
area, and Suganuma contends that this is a major motivating factor for Japan to agree to 
shelve the discussion of sovereignty and mutually develop the area with Beijing. The 
second scenario Suganuma supposes is what he calls the “Japanese Unilateral 
Development Scenario,” which he declares is the “most unlikely way to resolve the 
issue.”145 In this scenario, Suganuma supposes that the Japanese could unilaterally 
develop the natural resources around Diaoyu/Senkaku during a possible period of “civil 
war or ethnic unrest” within China. Because this scenario requires total chaos to engulf 
the Chinese government, ultimately distracting them from Japanese actions concerning 
the islands, Suganuma believes this scenario is highly unlikely. Lastly, and the most 
dangerous resolution to this outcome is what Suganuma declares is the “Third Sino-
Japanese War Scenario,” whereby if China’s political and military strength gets to the 
point where it no longer sees the presence of the United States as a viable deterrent to 
military action they could look to forcefully resolve the issue.146 Suganuma concludes 
that what makes this scenario even more dangerous is that the United Nations will be 
unable to broker a peace because both Beijing and Washington maintain positions on the 
UN Security Council. Ultimately, he declares that the “international community would 
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simply have to stand by and watch the messy war in the East China Sea.”147 However, 
Suganuma maintains this scenario remains presently unlikely, and that ultimately, the 
situation can and should be resolved by Tokyo and Beijing shelving their irredentist 
claims and developing the natural resources around the islands together, to their mutual 
benefit. 
Krista Wiegand also hypothesizes that joint development of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku’s is the best path toward a resolution of this dispute, declaring it to be 
the “most rational strategy” for Beijing to take.148 However, while China continues to 
push for joint development of the islands, there remains “little incentive for China to drop 
its territorial claim” because it comes at a very small political cost since China remains 
the challenger in the dispute.149 Wiegand asserts that China maintains its territorial claim 
to the islands, despite pushing for joint development, because this ties directly to their 
history of coercive diplomacy whereby they use these territorial disputes as “bargaining 
leverage” in order to get diplomatic concessions from their neighbors on other issues.150 
Ultimately, Wiegand concludes that the Chinese are very unlikely to push for any 
concrete resolution of the conflict while there remain other strains on diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan, such as the history textbook controversy, the role of the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces, and Japanese Nationalists attempts to revise Japan’s 
pacifist constitution. Therefore, Wiegand argues the Chinese will keep the territorial 
dispute as a relevant point of contention until “relations [with Japan] have improved 
significantly enough that there are no longer any disputed issues…that are significant 
enough to link to the territorial dispute.”151 Hence, Wiegand concludes that the territorial 
dispute is likely to “continue to endure” with China continuing to maintain diplomatic 
leverage.  
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Like Wiegand, Taylor Fravel argues that there remains little incentive for the 
Chinese to compromise over the islands, and therefore, Beijing will continue to pursue a 
“delaying strategy” regarding the dispute in order to “bide time and…avoid damaging 
China’s [economic] relations with Japan.”152 Furthermore, Fravel expands upon this 
point in his essay, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,” by 
contending that China will continue to pursue a delaying strategy in regards to the islands 
because “compromise must yield some tangible benefit that exceeds the expected value 
of sovereignty over the land at stake and the likely costs…of compromise…[Therefore] if 
the net benefits of compromise are limited, then states should persist with a delaying 
strategy in a dispute.”153 Therefore, because the benefits of compromise do not override 
the benefits of delay, China will continue to avoid compromise.  
Ultimately, while his overarching thesis is that China has avoided conflict and 
mostly compromised in its territorial disputes, Fravel concludes that because of the lack 
of incentive to compromise, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands—along with Taiwan—remain 
the most likely of China’s territorial disputes to lead to war.154 Yet, while Fravel notes 
that the rise of nationalism in both China and Japan “may also further reduce the already 
slim odds of compromise” over Diaoyu/Senkaku, “nationalist pressures…have not 
translated into increasingly frequent threats to use force or an unwillingness to 
compromise.”155 Ultimately, Fravel insists the reason China will not compromise over 
Diaoyu/Senkaku is because it does not have to. Despite the tension, China continues to 
exhibit a healthy economic relationship with both Tokyo and Washington, and so far 
increased rhetoric over the islands has not led to any rash calls for military action. 
Therefore, Fravel contends that the dispute will continue to simmer, with little likelihood  
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of compromise or escalation, with settlement only possibly “in the event of a grand 
bargain amid a broader Japanese-Chinese entente, in which improved bilateral relations 
outweigh the value of controlling the islands.”156  
In conclusion, all three authors continue to insist that while the dispute maintains 
the threat of escalation, an all out war over the islands remains unlikely. Ultimately, they 
all conclude that both China and Japan can benefit significantly from ignoring the 
nationalist calls regarding historical ownership over the islands, and just focus on the 
mutually beneficial track of joint development. Unfortunately, due to their violent history 
and close geographic proximity, a deep distrust of one another remains, and has played a 
significant role in hindering joint development. 
E. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Recognizing that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute is unlikely to lead to a 
peaceful compromise in the near future, it is imperative the United States continues to 
pursue peaceful diplomatic solutions to the dispute. This said, because Japan represents 
the key American ally in the Asia-Pacific region, it remains clear the United States will 
use military force to defend its national interests in the event of a war with China. 
Therefore, it is critical for Washington to take the steps necessary to avoid what would be 
a devastating and destabilizing war in the Pacific.  
In his essay, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible 
Solutions,” Mark J. Valencia lists four major actions that must be taken by Washington, 
Tokyo, and Beijing to ensure that escalated tensions regarding the islands does not lead to 
war. First, Valencia suggests the United States should work to remove Taiwan’s claim 
over the islands “by making clear that [Washington’s] recognition of the PRC as the sole 
legitimate government of China carries with it recognition of the PRC as the sole 
representative of Chinese claims to the continental shelf and [exclusive economic 
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zone].”157 By taking this action, Valencia argues that this would “encourage Japan to do 
likewise, and could incidentally help improve Sino-Japanese relations.”158  
Secondly, Valencia insists that both Beijing and Tokyo should also work together 
to discourage nationalist groups within their nations from taking provocative actions 
(such as protests, demonstrations, attempts to plant flags) regarding the islands. Valencia 
argues that the governments of China and Japan should not advocate such acts and that 
they must be willing to “disapprove” of them publicly.159 Valencia declares that by 
publicly voicing their disapproval of these provocations, it will help further instill trust 
between the two countries and will alleviate tensions. Third, Valencia insists the 
international community must work with Beijing and Tokyo at developing international 
institutions that emphasize “preventive diplomacy.” Valencia argues that the purpose of 
this institution would not be resolution of the territorial dispute, “but rather to consider 
ways of managing the dispute nonviolently and preventing, or at least controlling, 
escalation should there be more flare-ups.”160 As a model, Valencia suggests the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, which represents an excellent international institution that allows the 
United States to work with member states in Southeast Asia to help avoid escalation of 
regional conflicts. 
Lastly, Valencia recognizes that the most significant threat of an escalation of this 
dispute is by Japan firing upon a Chinese military vessel it has deemed has violated its 
territorial air space or waters. In order to avoid this scenario, Valencia declares that the 
United States must help broker a bilateral agreement between Tokyo and Beijing 
regarding strict international guidelines for the movement of military vessels within each 
other’s territorial space. Valencia’s hope is that such an agreement could “lead to a 
‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East China Sea,’ [which he declares would 
be] similar but more robust than that reached by the multiple claimants to the South 
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China Sea, of which China is the most prominent.”161 Valencia concludes that by taking 
these actions, Sino-Japanese relations are bound to improve. Ultimately, he asserts that 
improved Sino-Japanese relations would remove the obstacles surrounding joint 
development and could lead to a bilateral agreement between Tokyo and Beijing to 
ignore historical claims of ownership over the islands and invest in a mutually beneficial 
plan to take advantage of the islands natural resources.  
Therefore, as Valencia’s proposals suggest, there remains actions that the United 
States can take to help encourage improved bilateral relations between China and Japan 
regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea. Due to its close economic 
relationship with both nations, it is imperative that the United States continues to 
encourage and emphasize economic interdependence within East Asia. While military 
conflict remains unlikely, it remains paramount for the United States to continue to 
provide and promote economic incentives and international institutions to help avoid 
escalation.  
Conversely, one counterargument to the thesis is the increasing role of 
nationalism within both countries. Shinzo Abe’s return to power in Japan—arguably on 
the back of his more aggressive foreign policy platform—may represent a growing trend 
among the Japanese to push for a revision of Japan’s pacifist constitution and increase the 
capability and significance of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Consequently, rising 
nationalism within Japan is bound to spur similar nationalist sentiments within China, 
which could encourage both governments to bolster their domestic support by taking 
harder stances regarding the disputed islands. So far, as Fravel argues in Strong Borders 
Secure Nation, these increased nationalist sentiments have yet to lead to an escalation of 
the conflict or an unwillingness to participate in diplomacy from either side, but it is a 
factor to which the United States must continue to pay close attention. In the end, 
however, as all the authors reviewed in this chapter suggest, the best path toward 
promoting peace in the region is for the United States to continue to promote close  
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economic relationships among its partners in Asia, and work to develop the necessary 
international institutions in order to provide guidance and direction in the event of any 
further escalation of China’s territorial disputes.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS TO U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY IN ASIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the information discussed over the course 
of this thesis, while also providing some broader conclusions regarding future U.S. 
foreign policy in Asia. Moreover, this chapter first revisits the debate between alarmists 
and pragmatists outlined in Chapter I of the thesis. Paying specific attention to the 
differing conclusions regarding China’s rise to power, this chapter seeks to put China’s 
rise into context, using the historical information discussed in the three case studies as 
supporting evidence. Secondly, this chapter expands upon the case studies examined in 
this thesis in order to draw specific lessons learned regarding long-term U.S. strategy in 
Asia. Accordingly, recommendations concerning the potential future expansion or 
regression of American influence in Asia are consequently made. Lastly, this chapter 
provides concluding thoughts and observations regarding the future security situation 
within Asia, and provides suggestions for how Beijing and Washington can work 
together to promote the continued peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. 
B. TAKING CHINA’S RISE IN CONTEXT: IS CONFLICT LIKELY? 
Over the past two decades, the rapid modernization of China’s PLA has provoked 
great consternation in Washington regarding Beijing’s motivations behind the buildup, 
and how it may affect American strategic interests in Asia. The Chinese CCP has sought 
to reassure alarmists in Washington that China’s military buildup is being done with 
peaceful intentions, insisting that the increase in China’s military capability is only 
natural due to its economic ascendance and its subsequent increased role in the 
international community. In his article “It is Completely Justifiable to Reinforce the Wall 





household improves, it is…natural [to]…improve the fence or the wall around the house. 
Now, as [China] gets richer, it is natural that we allocate…money to strengthen our 
national defense and armed forces.”162  
Such statements, however, have done little to temper the fears of Western 
observers who continue to insist that China’s military buildup is being done to reassert 
Chinese dominance in Asia. Steven Mosher, in his book, Hegemon: China’s Plan to 
Dominate Asia and the Rest of the World, paints a much more sobering picture of 
Chinese intentions. Mosher declares that China’s military rise is being done specifically 
to seek revenge against Western imperialism during the “Century of Humiliation” and 
that “only the complete recovery of China’s lost possessions and its hegemonic status 
would fully vindicate China’s humiliation at the hands of [its] perceived inferiors.”163 
Furthermore, in referencing disagreements between CCP leader Jiang Zemin and top 
PLA generals regarding China’s strategic military goals at the beginning of the 21st 
century, Mosher declared that such arguments were not the result of disagreement 
regarding long-term goals, but merely about the timing of future Chinese actions. Mosher 
argues that there is no debate regarding “China’s long-term strategic goals…[China’s 
leaders] are of one mind that Taiwan should be recovered, Japan neutralized, and the US 
driven out of Asia.”164 Therefore, Mosher’s conclusion is that China sees military 
conflict with the United States as inevitable and has therefore built up its forces in 
anticipation of this conflict with “the unspoken goal…to break America’s back in Asia 
and thus end America’s reign as the sole superpower in the world.”165 
Nevertheless, despite the insistence of alarmists, such as Mosher, it remains 
difficult to ascertain exactly what China’s true intentions are for the future. Therefore, 
going forward it is necessary to analyze the recent history of China objectively and 
attempt to draw conclusions from its past decisions to either act aggressively or 
                                                 
162 Meng Yan, “It Is Completely Justifiable to Reinforce the Wall Around One’s House,” Jiefangjun 
Bao Online, March 9, 2013.  
163 Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco, CA: 
Encounter Books, 2001), 68.  
164 Ibid., 73.  
165 Ibid., 95.  
 71 
compromise diplomatically. In so doing, several immediate conclusions can be drawn. 
First, despite the fearful rhetoric of the alarmists, the expansion of China’s military to this 
point is understandable. At the beginning of the military modernization and reforms of 
the 1980s, China’s military was woefully ill equipped to defend itself. Beijing’s military 
was overly reliant on strength in numbers and not technology, and after witnessing 
Washington’s crushing victory over Saddam Hussein’s massive Iraqi army during the 
1991 Persian Gulf War, China quickly understood it could no longer rely on numerical 
superiority in armed personnel alone in order to deter an American invasion. Therefore, 
China wisely began to heavily invest in its military modernization in order to catch up to 
the world’s more advanced militaries. Understanding that this military modernization 
came hand in hand with double-digit economic growth within China, it is not difficult to 
question China’s intentions. Ultimately, the bottom line behind China’s recent military 
modernization program was that China recognized it not only lagged behind the United 
States in terms of military capability, but also found that many of its neighbors—Taiwan 
included—far surpassed Beijing’s military capability.  
Another major conclusion that can be drawn about the potential for future Chinese 
aggression is that China’s rise has been done within the norms of the current international 
system. China has embraced free-market capitalism by gradually opening up its economy 
to Western markets and has invested heavily market-based institutions, such as the World 
Trade Organization. Furthermore, by opening up its economy, China has become 
increasingly interdependent with the United States and its neighbors in South Korea and 
Japan. As Doug Bandow observes in his article, “There’s a Great Deal for the U.S. to 
Celebrate in China’s Rise,” economic investment and trade between China and the 
United States “now exceeds a half trillion dollars a year.”166 This increased economic 
interdependence, Bandow concludes, is bound to lead to increased cooperation on a 
number of other issues, such as “peacekeeping, anti-piracy operations, environmental 
protection, humanitarian relief, combating terrorism, and conflict resolution.”167 
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Ultimately, because the CCP understands that regime survival is tied directly to economic 
growth, it is highly unlikely to implement rash foreign policy decisions, which could 
have a destabilizing effect on China’s economy. This, above all other issues, remains the 
largest deterrent to Chinese military aggression in its territorial disputes. 
Then again, despite the compelling arguments for deterrence regarding Chinese 
aggression, the nebulous aura surrounding China’s long-term strategic intentions has 
furthered fostered distrust from the international community. John Mearsheimer 
highlights this growing distrust over China’s intentions. Referencing the 2009 Australian 
Defense White Paper, Mearsheimer quotes Australia’s concern that “the pace, scope and 
structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause 
for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build 
confidence regarding its military plans.”168 Mearsheimer’s argument is simple: while 
China continues to insist its intentions are peaceful and that it has no desire to act 
aggressively towards its neighbors or the United States, it continues to invest large sums 
of money into the development of a modern military that for all intents and purposes has 
been designed for the specific purpose of discouraging American involvement in the 
event of an escalation of tensions with Taiwan. 
Ultimately, by working to limit the capability of the American military to 
influence foreign policy in the Pacific, Mearsheimer believes the main reason behind 
China’s military modernization is to enable it to “dominate the Asia-Pacific region much 
as the United States dominates the Western hemisphere.”169 Therefore, while China 
rightly has little desire to go to war with the United States, it does want to create a 
situation where the United States cannot dictate the political behavior of China or its 
neighbors. In the end, Mearsheimer declares that China’s long-term goal is to return to its 
dominant position over the rest of Asia. 
While pragmatists, such as Taylor Fravel have pointed to China’s recent history 
of compromise in its territorial disputes as proof that alarmist fears regarding a stronger 
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China are unwarranted, Mearsheimer quickly dismisses this argument. Accordingly, 
Mearsheimer sees little utility in the history argument, because he believes that “past 
behavior is…not a reliable indicator of future behavior because leaders come and go and 
some are more hawkish than others.”170 Mearsheimer contends that in the past, China has 
resisted aggression because it was not strong enough to fulfill its broader goals. 
Subsequently, he argues that the real indicator to China’s intentions will come when it 
reaches a subsequent position of military strength that it does not have to fear the 
interference of outside actors, such as the United States. It is then, Mearsheimer 
concludes, that “we will see how committed [China] is to the status quo.”171 If 
Mearsheimer’s contention holds true, once China reaches a dominant position of power, 
it will be free to act out its true intentions and will reclaim its position as the hegemonic 
power in Asia. 
Bruce Elleman echoes Mearsheimer’s sentiment that the situation with China is 
constantly changing, and therefore, it is currently impossible to develop concrete 
conclusions regarding China’s true intentions. Referencing an analysis done in 2000 by 
Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis regarding potential changes in a nation’s external 
behavior as it reaches great power status, Elleman declares that there are multiple key 
“behavioral changes that Beijing might adopt” that would signal a change to a more 
aggressive Chinese foreign policy, such as:  
The [augmentation] of military capabilities, the [development of] a sphere 
of influence, [an increased desire to] redress past wrongs, [the rewriting 
of] the prevailing ‘rules of the game’ to reflect its own interests, and [a 
preparation of its forces]…to ‘thwart preventive war or to launch 
predatory attacks on its foes.’172 
Disturbingly, Elleman argues that over the past few decades, China has embraced all of 
those behavioral changes. He concludes that the sixth behavioral trait Swaine and Tellis 
lists regarding a rising nations desire to seek to “acquire new or reclaim old territory for 
their resources or for symbolic reasons by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or 
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bystanders who resist such claims,” remains the ultimate indicator of an embrace by 
Beijing of a more aggressive foreign policy.173 Therefore, Elleman’s contention is that, 
should China attempt to use its increased political and military power to force the 
resolution of a territorial dispute, it is a signal that China’s long-term desire is indeed 
regional hegemony. 
Therefore, China’s actions over the next decade must be monitored carefully. The 
study of recent history has shown that Beijing has not typically gone to war over its 
territorial disputes, often preferring to use them as political bargaining chips in order to 
secure favorable diplomatic agreements with its neighbors. Furthermore, it is also true 
that there are many reasons currently deterring China from the installment of an 
aggressive foreign policy strategy. Certainly, that remains the case today, as China’s 
economy continues to develop and its military power—while steadily improving—
remains inferior to Washington’s. Ultimately, as both Mearsheimer and Elleman suggest, 
the real test of China’s intentions will come once it assumes the role of a dominant 
economic and military power, which it may achieve within the next few decades. By that 
time, domestic and economic challenges within the United States may have taken its toll 
on Washington’s power projection capabilities, leaving it unable to check Chinese 
aggression in Asia. How China reacts to this situation will truly decide whether Beijing’s 
long-term goals align with globalization and economic interdependence or a return to 
Chinese hegemony over Asia. 
C. MAPPING LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGY IN ASIA: LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
Understanding that future Chinese actions regarding its territorial disputes 
remains uncertain and subject to change, what lessons can be learned from the three case 
studies examined in this thesis and how can that be applied to long-term U.S. strategy in 
Asia? Ultimately, what the case studies have shown is that while tensions over these three 
disputed regions have increased over the past decade or so, the risk of an escalation of 
conflict within Asia continues to remain low. As discussed, current factors, such as 
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increasing economic interdependence with its neighbors and the continued presence of 
American military forces in the region, serves as powerful deterrents to Chinese 
aggression over its territorial disputes. Therefore, current factors have created a unique 
opportunity for cooperation between the United States and China. As China’s subsequent 
power grows, the United States may find it more difficult to influence Chinese foreign 
policy, and therefore, it is important that it act proactively to encourage China’s 
continued peaceful rise and acceptance of international political norms. Encouragingly, 
all three case studies provide the United States with ample opportunity for mutual benefit 
and cooperation with Beijing. 
In Central Asia, Washington has an excellent opportunity to cooperate with China 
on counterterrorism. As Bruce Elleman concludes, the greatest risk over the escalation of 
tensions in Central Asia “remains the transnational threat of terrorism, especially Islamic 
fundamentalist influence over the Uyghurs of Xinjiang.”174 This mounting fear of Islamic 
radicalism dictating actions among the Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang has prompted 
Beijing’s harsh responses to any and all forms of Uyghur protests against the central 
government. The United States, having spent the last decade battling Islamic terrorists 
while subsequently developing positive relationships with moderate Muslim politicians in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan has the unique experience necessary to assist Beijing with its 
ethnic issues within Xinjiang. If Beijing is willing, the United States has a wealth of 
experience regarding the international Islamic terrorist networks within Central Asia—
including the ETIM currently embedded in Xinjiang—which could be made available to 
Beijing through increased intelligence sharing or bilateral counterterrorist exercises 
between the two nations. Ultimately, developing a mutual trust between the two nations 
military and intelligence services would go a long way in fostering positive diplomatic 
relations and could play a major role in encouraging a rising China to relinquish any 
hegemonic aspirations.  
However, as the Central Asian case study suggests, any increased cooperation 
between Washington and Beijing regarding counterterrorism must be done in an ethical 
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manner. One major advantage of increased cooperation regarding Beijing’s 
counterterrorist policies would be the opportunity for Washington to campaign for the 
protection of the human rights of non-violent Uyghurs. As Elizabeth Van Wie Davis 
argues in her essay, “Uyghur Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang China,” many in the 
international community “fear that China is using the war on terror to disregard the 
human rights of Uyghurs…Not only are human rights abuses abhorrent…but also the 
Chinese worsen the problem by targeting and antagonizing nonviolent Uyghurs.”175 In 
Xinjiang, the United States must continue to champion the preservation of human rights, 
for it knows full well from its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that the perception of 
human rights abuses will only foster greater public outcry and increase the risk of 
violence. If both the United States and China want to resolve the situation within 
Xinjiang peacefully, it is paramount that Washington encourages Beijing to stop its 
blanket persecution of Uyghur Muslims—and encourage dialogue between the CCP and 
peaceful Uyghur separatists—while shifting its counterterrorist efforts toward eliminating 
Islamic radical networks within Xinjiang. Thus, should Beijing and Washington be open 
to cooperation and dialogue regarding the proper execution of a counterterrorist 
campaign within the disputed region, positive developments within Xinjiang can occur in 
time. 
As in Central Asia, positive developments can be ascertained from the study of 
the Sino-Indian border dispute. Firstly, despite a recent uptick in rhetoric between Beijing 
and New Delhi regarding its contested border in Arunachal Pradesh, it remains highly 
unlikely that Sino-Indian border tensions will result in any kind of military conflict. As 
the case study suggests, increased hostilities between the two nations regarding this 
disputed region can mostly be attributed to political handwringing, as Beijing attempts to 
use the dispute as a political bargaining chip in future diplomatic negotiations with its 
neighbor and emerging economic rival. Therefore, for the United States, positive 
developments can occur from an increased Sino-Indian competition.  
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Specifically, the United States as an independent observer can gain significant 
political influence with both New Delhi and Beijing as both nations compete for 
American support for their territorial claims. While the United States has long seen India 
as a key potential ally to balance against a rising China, perhaps the best policy for 
Washington is to remain neutral in any escalated Sino-Indian dispute. New Delhi has 
shown little resolve to ally formally with the United States to begin with, and any future 
attempt by Washington to promote a formal alliance against China would inevitably 
alienate Beijing and could encourage them to begin to act more aggressively against 
American interests in Asia. Since the United States greatly desires that a rising China 
respect the current international political and economic institutions within Asia, this 
policy could be disastrous.  
Going forward, Washington should do everything in its power to encourage 
Chinese engagement and cooperation, and should avoid any actions that could foster 
distrust with the emerging nation. Therefore, the United States should continue to 
encourage continued political and economic cooperation with both nations, and cement 
its position as a political and economic partner to both Asian powers. Consequently, as 
discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis, in the event that China’s long-term aspirations turn 
out to be aggressive, an increased Sino-Indian rivalry would play a valuable role in 
diverting Chinese military funds away from naval expansion and modernization. As Evan 
Montgomery argues in his essay, “Competitive Strategies against Continental Powers: 
The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Relations,” “should Beijing respond to an 
Indian military buildup it would confront significant opportunity costs, potentially 
diminishing the resources that it could devote to the aerospace and maritime capabilities 
that are most worrisome to the United States.”176 As Montgomery’s conclusion suggests, 
the greatest threat the U.S. military faces in promoting its strategic interests in Asia is 
China’s rising naval and aerospace capability exercised in an anti-access area denial 
strategy; therefore, any situation that diverts Beijing’s attention away from the pursuit of 
this capability will yield tangible strategic benefits to the United States. 
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Lastly, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute can also yield positive benefits for 
American interests in Asia. This said, of the three case studies examined in this thesis, the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute remains the most dangerous. China and Japan have a very 
unique and combative history, as the bitter memory of Japanese aggression during the 
early 20th century continues to fuel hostility and encourage nationalistic irredentism 
within both nations. Furthermore, the discovery of vast natural resources in the waters 
surrounding the islands has only enflamed tensions over the ownership of the islands. 
Thus, it remains paramount for China, Japan, and the United States to remain engaged in 
discussions regarding the dispute, with the best policy to shelve Chinese and Japanese 
historical claims of ownership and instead focus on the development of the natural 
resources to the mutual benefit of both nations.  
While the diplomatic relationship between Tokyo and Beijing remains fragile and 
subject to conflict, over the past decade, both nations have worked to downplay historical 
disputes—such as the islands dispute—and worked to encourage mutually beneficial 
economic relations. As Taylor Fravel concludes, “both sides have managed the dispute 
effectively and prevented it from becoming a central issue in China-Japan relations.”177 
Therefore, this has established a noteworthy precedent in Sino-Japanese relations 
whereby both nations have emphasized economic gains over long-standing political 
rivalry, animosity, and distrust. Consequently, the mutual development of the islands can 
provide tangible benefits for both nations and would go a long way toward rebuilding 
positive relations. As Krista Wiegand argues in Enduring Territorial Disputes, the last 
thing China wants is to disturb increasing economic relations with Tokyo. Ultimately, 
Wiegand insists that because “Chinese policymakers have prioritized economic 
development and modernization over sovereignty,” there remains a great incentive for 
China to seek a compromise in its territorial dispute with Japan centered on the joint 
development of the islands natural resources.178 Therefore, in order to avoid being drawn 
into a potentially catastrophic conflict between its key ally in Asia and its most dangerous  
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potential adversary, it is paramount that the United States continues to emphasize the 
economic benefits of joint development. Only then, can this potentially debilitating 
dispute be settled. 
All this said, what is the road ahead for American foreign policy regarding 
China’s territorial disputes? Ultimately, in order to best counter the challenges associated 
with these varying territorial disputes, Washington must remain flexible and seek to 
promote both neo-realist and neo-liberal measures in its dealings with Beijing. China has 
risen within the context of the current international political and economic structure. It 
greatly values its permanent position on the UN Security Council and it has continued to 
promote the development of multi-national institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organization, East Asian Forum, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In this 
context, it is clear that China has worked hard to become a responsible and respected 
member of the international community. The United States would be wise to pursue neo-
liberal measures in its foreign relations with China, and continue to promote China’s 
involvement in peaceful and productive international organizations in order to encourage 
China to rise peacefully. Furthermore, getting China to embrace neo-liberal maxims 
would ultimately discourage Beijing from using military force, as Robert O. Keohane and 
Joseph S. Nye argue in their essay, “Power and Interdependence,” “the use of force often 
has costly effects on non-security goals.”179 Therefore, engagement with China along 
neo-liberal measures can help promote peace and cooperation within the region. 
However, the United States must not completely embrace neo-liberal measures 
alone. It is extremely dangerous to assume that membership in international institutions 
and economic interdependence alone will ensure peace—one needs only reference the 
political situation in Europe in late July 1914 to understand the folly of blind faith in 
liberalism—and therefore, the United States must also take the appropriate measures in 
case China decides to act aggressively. As John Mearsheimer infamously stated in The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, China represents the “high church of realpolitik in the 
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post-Cold War world.”180 Accordingly, Mearsheimer declares that China’s decision to 
embrace economic and military modernization over the past few decades has been done 
to counter American influence in Asia, and ultimately, restore Chinese hegemony in the 
region. Consequently, China’s economic rise and military modernization has 
subsequently prompted the expansion of realist maxims within Washington in order to 
balance Beijing’s military expansion via the highly publicized “pivot to the Pacific,” 
which emphasizes the forward deployment of American military assets to the Asia-
Pacific region and a reliance on nuclear deterrence to prevent aggressive Chinese military 
action. Nonetheless, neo-realists, such as Mearsheimer, will argue that the United States 
should not fear the expansion of China, for as the history of the Cold War suggests, the 
reemergence of a bipolar balance of power could lead to renewed peace and security due 
to mutual respect and fear.181  
Consequently, the continued presence of American military assets in Asia will 
continue to serve as a stabilizing factor within the region, particularly in regards to its 
security alliance with Japan. As Charles Glaser argues in his essay, “Will China’s Rise 
Lead to War,” an adoption of realist measures against China does not mean war with 
China is inevitable. Glaser admits that the forward presence of American military forces 
in Asia constrains China’s ability to act unilaterally against its neighbors, which fosters 
anger and hostility in Beijing. However, he also declares that the presence of the U.S. 
military in Asia “benefits China by enabling Japan to spend far less on defense… [and 
therefore] China has seen the alliance as adding to regional stability, because it fears 
Japan more than the United States.”182 Therefore, in order to continue to promote peace 
and stability in the region, the continued presence of American military assets in the 
region remains vital.  
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D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
The three case studies examined in this thesis suggest that war with China in the 
near future remains very unlikely. Although China has seemingly embraced many realist 
measures in fostering its political rise with the development of a robust and expensive 
military modernization program, China has also risen peacefully within the context of the 
current international political structure and has championed its involvement in peaceful 
international institutions. Furthermore, historical evidence has proven that despite 
bordering numerous hostile neighbors, the PRC has rarely gone to war to settle a 
territorial dispute. This thesis ultimately agrees with Taylor Fravel and Krista Wiegand’s 
argument that China has historically sought to avoid war over disputed territories because 
it values their use as political bargaining chips.  
Additionally, looking ahead, there is a variety of reasons that will continue to 
discourage China from acting aggressively to solve its territorial disputes. Despite its 
rising political, economic, and military power, China remains constrained. Any 
aggressive action it decides to take will ultimately undermine the massive economic 
growth on which the CCP has staked its political legitimacy. China has strong economic 
ties to Central Asia, India, and Japan, and therefore, any pursuit of a military solution to 
its territorial disputes in these regions would greatly hinder China’s growth. This said, the 
examination of these three case studies suggests it would be foolhardy for the CCP to act 
aggressively to resolve its territorial disputes. Thus, there remains a great incentive for 
China to continue to work within the current international system. While Beijing may 
continue to harbor strong desires to reclaim its “lost” territories, restore Chinese 
authority, and ultimately, reinstate Chinese hegemony over the region, it will most likely 
attempt to do so via continued economic growth and political bargaining. Thus, the 
United States should continue to engage China from a neo-liberal perspective, in the hope 
that China’s entrenchment in international institutions and norms will foster peaceful 
intentions in Beijing. 
Conversely, however, while the United States continues to promote neo-
liberalism within Asia, it must remain dedicated to maintaining its military deterrent in 
the event China decides to act irrationally. While there are a multitude of reasons for 
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China to pursue peaceful resolutions to its territorial disputes, it only takes one irrational 
actor to offset the current peace and stability in the region. To illustrate this point, realist 
thinker Kenneth Waltz, in his book, Man, the State and War, brought up Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s infamous quote that in order for the world “to be peaceable and for harmony 
to be maintained, all the citizens without exception would have to be [equally] good…if 
by ill hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite…he would certainly get the 
better of his pious compatriots.”183 Thus, the United States must be prepared to act in the 
event of an irrational decision by the Chinese. Therefore, the current emphasis on the 
Asia-Pacific region that is illustrated by the American “pivot” to the Pacific is a wise 
foreign policy objective.  
As the conclusions drawn by realists, such as Mearsheimer, Waltz, and Glaser 
attest, realist-balancing policies are not fundamentally destabilizing. Ultimately, such 
actions help promote peace due to the mutual respect for the capabilities of the other side 
that results from realist measures being adopted by rival nations. China will continue to 
pursue a position of stronger influence within Asia no matter what the United States does. 
Beijing may accept the diplomatic realities presented through its involvement in liberal 
institutions, but that will not change China’s intentions if its ultimate goal is to become 
the dominant power in Asia. Furthermore, if the United States were to rely on 
international institutions alone, and subsequently, decrease its military presence in the 
region, then it would have given up its capability to deter Chinese aggression, and could, 
therefore, find it extremely difficult to bargain with China and promote its peaceful rise.  
All of this said, in the end, an economically strong and peaceful China will 
present a positive development for both the United States and the rest of Asia. It can be 
argued that the most dangerous and chaotic period of Asian history came during the 
period in which China was at its weakest; in the decades immediately following the 
breakup of the Qing Dynasty. Given the presence of a politically and militarily weak 
adversary in China, the rising militant regime in Tokyo took advantage of the 
vulnerability of China, and subsequently, waged a war of violent conquest that 
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reverberated throughout Asia. Therefore, it remains in the best interest of the United 
States and Asia as a whole for China to be politically strong, because a strong China has 
historically deterred aggression, and therefore, maintained the peace and stability of Asia. 
Furthermore, as Taylor Fravel concludes, a strong and satisfied China is very unlikely to 
resort to force to resolve a territorial dispute.184 Taiwan, of course, remains the outlier, 
but in every other case, cooperation and compromise can lead to a positive resolution of 
China’s disputes. China understands this more than anyone, because it continues to hold 
onto its territorial claims as valuable political bargaining chips. The challenge for the 
United States and China’s neighbors is to figure out exactly what China’s ultimate price 
is.  
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